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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3Q) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether any existing incident report created pursuant to Utah's care-review

statute, Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1 (1998), is privileged and not subject to discovery.1
The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to compel production of any existing incident
report in a Minute Entry dated March 4,2004. R. at 173-75, attached as Exhibit A to
Addendum. The trial court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to compel is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Pack v. Case, 2001 LTApp 232, ^ 16, 30 P.3d 436. The trial court's
interpretation of Utah's care review statute is a question of law that is reviewed for
correctness. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Utah 1998). The trial court's
acceptance of the facts set forth in the affidavit supporting application of Utah's carereview statute is reviewed "under a broad grant of discretion." In re Gen. Determination
ofRights to Use ofAll the Water, 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 1999).
2.

Whether issues regarding further discovery are properly before the Court.

The Minute Entry appealed from does not address further discovery regarding any
existing incident report. R. at 173-75. Utah's appellate courts serve the "limited
function" of reviewing "orders and judgments made by the trial court in the first

'Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-25-1, -2 and -4 were amended in 2004. Because this suit
was commenced in 2002, the 1998 version of the statute applies. State ex rel T.M., 2003
UT App 191,117, 73 P.3d 959. In any event, the 2004 statutory amendments do not
affect the issues on appeal.
-1-

instance." Brumley v. Utah State Tax Comm % 868 P.2d 796, 802 (Utah 1994) (denying
petition for rehearing).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda,
or other data furnished by reason of this chapter, and any
findings or conclusions resulting from those studies are
privileged communications and are not subject to discovery,
use, or receipt in evidence in any legal proceeding of any kind
or character.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3 (1998) (attached as Exhibit B to Addendum).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or around December 16, 2002, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit alleging medical
malpractice against Salt Lake Regional Medical Center (the "Hospital"). R. at 10.
Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for Production of Documents includes a request for each
incident report that may exist regarding Mr. Cannon's alleged fall while he was a patient
at the Hospital. R. at 13-14. The Hospital objected to plaintiffs' request for any existing
incident report on the grounds of the privilege contained in Utah's care-review statute,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-25-1 to - 5. R. at 42-43.
On October 24, 2003, plaintiffs served a motion to compel production of any
incident report that may exist with respect to Mr. Cannon's alleged fall ("First Motion to
Compel"). R. at 58-67. On November 17,2003, the Hospital served its memorandum in
opposition to plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. R. at 68-92. Attached to the Hospital's
memorandum is the affidavit of Linda Wright, who is the Risk Manager in the Hospital's
Quality Assurance Department. R. at 78-80, attached as Exhibit C to Addendum.
Plaintiffs served their reply memorandum in support of their First Motion to Compel on
-2-

December 5,2003. R. at 101-159. The trial court denied plaintiffs First Motion to
Compel in a March 4, 2004 Minute Entry. R. at 173-75; Exhibit A. Due to a clerical
error, copies of the Minute Entry were sent to the parties signed but undated. R. at 345.
To preserve plaintiffs' right to file a timely petition for interlocutory appeal, the trial court
entered a new Order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel in a Minute Entry dated
May 21, 2004. R. at 345, attached as Exhibit D to Addendum. The trial court's May 21,
2004 Minute Entry did not alter the substance of the March 4, 2004 Minute Entry or
otherwise change the trial court's reasoning for denying plaintiffs' First Motion to
Compel. R. at 345; Exhibit D.
On June 10, 2004, plaintiffs filed a petition for permission to appeal the trial
court's interlocutory Order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. Brief without
exhibits is attached as Exhibit E to Addendum. The sole issue presented by plaintiffs in
their petition is whether any existing incident report is discoverable. Exhibit E. On
June 16, 2004, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court for disposition.
R. at 359. This Court granted plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory appeal in an Order
dated June 28,2004. R. at 362.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This is an action for alleged medical malpractice arising from treatment

rendered to decedent Gary R. Cannon during his admission at the Hospital from May 16,
2001 through May 21, 2001. (R. at 3-5.)
2.

On May 18, 2001, Mr. Cannon was found on the floor in his hospital room.

(R. at 5.)
3.

Plaintiffs' first set of requests for production of documents includes a

request for any incident report that may exist regarding Mr. Cannon's alleged fall while
he was a patient at the Hospital. (R. at 13.)
4.

On February 24,2003, the Hospital responded to plaintiffs' first set of

interrogatories and requests for production of documents. The Hospital specifically
objected to plaintiffs' request for any existing incident report on the grounds of the carereview privilege, which is codified in Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-25-1 to -5. (R. 42-43.)
5.

On October 24,2003, plaintiffs served their First Motion to Compel

production of any incident report that may exist with respect to Mr. Cannon's alleged fall
at the Hospital. (R. at 58-67.)
6.

On November 16, 2003, the Hospital served its memorandum in opposition

to plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. Supporting the Hospital's memorandum is the
affidavit of Linda Wright, who is the Risk Manager in the Hospital's Quality Assurance
Department. (R. at 68-92; Exhibit C.)
7.

In her affidavit, Linda Wright testifies that the Hospital's Quality Assurance

Department is charged with the responsibility of collecting and evaluating incident

-4-

reports for the purpose of assessing, evaluating and improving the quality of health care
rendered to patients at the Hospital. (R. at 79; Exhibit C.)
8.

Ms. Wright further testifies that incident reports are not created or used for

any purpose other than for evaluating and improving the health care rendered to patients
at the Hospital. (R. at 79; Exhibit C.)
9.

Ms. Wright also testifies that incident reports are not included in the

patient's medical records and do not constitute routine business or medical records of the
Hospital. (R. at 79; Exhibit C.)
10.

Ms. Wright finally testifies that incident reports are necessary and critical to

the care-review work performed by the Hospital's Quality Assurance Department. (R. at
79; Exhibit C.)
11.

On December 5,2003, plaintiffs served a reply memorandum in support of

their First Motion to Compel and submitted the motion to the trial court for decision.
Plaintiffs did not request additional time to conduct discovery prior to submitting their
First Motion to Compel for decision. (R. at 99-159.)
12.

The trial court denied plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel in a March 4, 2004

Minute Entry. The trial court relied on Benson v. IHCHosp., Inc., 866 P.2d 537 (Utah
1993) and the undisputed affidavit testimony of Linda Wright in concluding that any
existing incident report is privileged and not discoverable. (R. at 173-175; Exhibit A.)
13.

Due to a clerical error, copies of the March 4, 2004 Minute Entry were sent

to counsel for the parties signed but not dated. To preserve plaintiffs' right to file a
timely petition for interlocutory appeal, the trial court entered a new Order denying
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plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel in a Minute Entry dated May 21, 2004. The trial
court's May 21, 2004 Minute Entry did not alter the substance of the March 4,2004
Minute Entry or otherwise change the trial court's reasoning for denying plaintiffs' First
Motion to Compel. (R. at 345; Exhibit D.)
14.

On June 10, 2004, plaintiffs filed a petition for permission to appeal the trial

court's Order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel (Exhibit E.)
15.

Following the trial court's Order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to

Compel, plaintiffs sought additional discovery related to any existing incident report.
Specifically, plaintiffs served interrogatories and requests for admission related to any
existing incident report. Plaintiffs also sought to depose Linda Wright and other Hospital
representatives who have knowledge about any existing incident report (the "Rule
30(b)(6) deponents"). Plaintiffs' notices of deposition are not included in the record on
appeal. (R. at 203-204,228.)
16.

In a letter dated March 19,2004, counsel for the Hospital informed

plaintiffs' counsel that the Hospital would not produce Linda Wright or the Rule 30(b)(6)
deponents for deposition questioning about any existing incident report unless ordered to
do so by the trial court. Counsel for the Hospital relied on the trial court's March 4,2004
Minute Entry in refusing to produce the requested deponents. (R. at 228.)
17.

On March 24,2004, plaintiffs filed a second motion to compel ("Second

Motion to Compel") the depositions of Linda Wright and the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents.
(R. at 215-230.)
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18.

In a Minute Entry dated May 21,2004, the trial court partially granted

plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel. Specifically, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs "are
entitled to depose Linda Wright." The Minute Entry is silent with respect to plaintiffs'
request for an order compelling the depositions of the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents. (R. at
347-48, attached as Exhibit F to Addendum.)
19.

Plaintiffs have not petitioned for interlocutory appeal of the trial court's

May 21, 2004 Minute Entry regarding the deposition of Linda Wright and the Rule
30(b)(6) deponents. (Exhibit A.)
20.

In April 2004, the Hospital responded to plaintiffs' interrogatories and

requests for admission related to any existing incident report. The Hospital objected to
the interrogatories and requests for admission on the grounds of attorney client privilege;
attorney work product doctrine; the trial court's March 4,2004 Minute Entry; Utah's
care-review statute; and the cases cited in the Hospital's memoranda in opposition to
plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. (R. at 330-335, 393-94.)
21.

On July 16,2004, the Hospital filed a motion for protective order and stay

of all discovery relating to any existing incident report pending disposition of the case on
appeal. The trial court has not yet ruled on the Hospital's motion. (R. at 375-406.)
22.

On August 9, 2004, plaintiffs responded to the Hospital's motion for

protective order and stay of all discovery pending appeal by filing a third motion to
compel ("Third Motion to Compel") answers to their interrogatories and requests for
admission related to any existing incident report. Plaintiffs' Third Motion to Compel also
seeks an order compelling the deposition of Linda Wright and the Rule 30(b)(6)
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deponents. Plaintiffs' Third Motion to Compel is not part of the appellate record in this
case, and the trial court has not yet ruled on the motion.
23.

On August 9, 2004, plaintiffs also filed a motion with this Court for an

extension of time to file their appellate brief and for an order compelling additional
discovery related to any existing incident report. Included in plaintiffs' motion is a
request for an order compelling (1) answers to plaintiffs' interrogatories and requests for
admission regarding any existing incident report; and (2) the depositions of Linda Wright
and the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents. (Pis.' Mot. for Ext. of Time; brief without exhibits
attached as Exhibit G to Addendum.)
24.

On August 26, 2004, the Hospital filed a memorandum in opposition to

plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to file their appellate brief and for an order
compelling additional discovery related to any existing incident report. (Hosp.'s Mem. in
Opp'n to Mot. for Ext. of Time; brief without exhibits attached as Exhibit H to
Addendum.)
25.

On September 2, 2004, this Court denied plaintiffs' motion for an extension

of time to file their appellate brief and for an order compelling additional discovery
related to any existing incident report. (9/2/04 Order, attached as Exhibit I to
Addendum.)
26.

The Hospital has disclosed the names of all Hospital employees known to

have discoverable information regarding the facts of this case, including the facts
surrounding Mr. Cannon's alleged fall. (R. at 35-39, 176-178.)
27.

Plaintiffs have not taken any depositions in this case.
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28.

Counsel for the Hospital has deposed the following individuals:
Dr. Ronald Ward
Dr. Diana Banks
Kathryn Cannon
Lane Cannon
Roland Cannon

3/24/04
2/27/04
10/21/03
10/21/03
10/21/03

Gary Cannon's treating physician
Kathryn Cannon's treating physician
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Plaintiff

(R. at 48-50,160-162,166-168.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case involves a straight forward application of Utah's care-review statute.
The undisputed affidavit testimony of Linda Wright establishes that any existing incident
report is privileged and not discoverable. The undisputed evidence also establishes that
all statutory and case law requirements for application of the care-review privilege have
been met. Furthermore, protection of any existing incident report is consistent with the
Utah State Legislature's intent and with public policy supporting the assessment and
improvement of health care.
Additional corroborative evidence or an in-camera review of any existing incident
report are not required under Utah law, and the trial court acted within its discretion in
denying plaintiffs' motion to compel any existing incident report without conducting an
in-camera review or requiring additional evidence to corroborate the testimony of Linda
Wright.
Plaintiffs already have access to the facts of this case, including the facts
surrounding Mr. Cannon's alleged fall, through non-privileged sources of discovery.
Protection of any existing incident report from discovery will neither preclude plaintiffs

-9-

from discovering the facts of the case nor abrogate their cause of action against the
Hospital.
The sole issue before the Court is whether any existing incident report is
discoverable. Issues pertaining to additional discovery related to any existing incident
report are not part of this interlocutory appeal and are not included in the record on
appeal. Therefore, the Court should refuse to consider arguments pertaining to such
issues. Rather, the Court should affirm the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' First Motion
to Compel and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT ANY
EXISTING INCIDENT REPORT IS PRIVILEGED

Utah's care-review statute provides that "any person" may provide "interviews,"
"reports," "statements" or "memoranda" to "any health facility's in-house staff committee
for the uses described in Subsection (3)" of section 26-25-1. Utah Code Ann. § 26-251(1), (2) (1998); Exhibit B. Subsection (3) in turn provides that the reports, statements or
memoranda may be provided for "the evaluation and improvement of hospital and health
care rendered by hospitals, health facilities, or health care providers." Utah Code Ann. §
26-25-1(3); Exhibit B. Finally, the statute provides that "[a]ll information, reports,
statements, memoranda, or other data" furnished by reason of the statute is "privileged
communications and [is] not subject to discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in any legal
proceeding of any kind or character." Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3 (1998); Exhibit B. The
privilege thus extends to all information furnished by reason of the statute and not merely
all non-factual information, as argued by plaintiffs. Pis.' Br., p. 11.
-10-

The affidavit testimony of Linda Wright establishes that any existing incident
report created in this case is privileged under the statute. First, there can be no dispute
that any existing incident report would in fact be a report, statement or memorandum. R.
at 79, % 2; Exhibit C. Moreover, Ms. Wright's affidavit establishes that the Hospital's
Quality Assurance Department is charged with the responsibility of collecting and
evaluating incident reports for the purpose of assessing and improving the quality of
health care provided to patients. R. at 79, ^ 2; Exhibit C. In addition, incident reports are
created and submitted to the Quality Assurance Department for the sole purpose of
evaluating and improving the care provided to patients at the Hospital. R. at 79,ffif3-5, 7;
Exhibit C. Finally, Ms. Wright's affidavit establishes that incident reports are critical to
the care-review function of the Quality Assurance Department. R. at 79, f 9; Exhibit C.
In the only case interpreting Utah's care-review statute, the Utah Supreme Court
concluded that the care-review privilege attaches only to materials that are prepared
specifically to be submitted for care-review purposes. Benson v. I.H.C. Hosp., Inc., 866
P.2d 537, 540 (1993). The affidavit of Linda Wright also establishes compliance with the
specifically-prepared requirement of Benson. The Quality Assurance Department
requires Hospital staff to prepare incident reports for all unusual occurrences. R. at 79, f
3; Exhibit C. The reports are specifically created for submission to the Quality Assurance
Department. R. at 79, If 4; Exhibit C. Just as important, the Quality Assurance
Department reviews each incident report that is created. R. at 79, f 5; Exhibit C. Incident
reports are required, submitted and reviewed because they are critical to the Quality
Assurance Department's responsibility for assessing and improving the quality of health
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care provided to patients at the Hospital. R. at 79, f 6; Exhibit C. Because incident
reports created by Hospital staff satisfy all statutory and common law requirements, any
existing incident report created in this case is privileged and not subject to discovery.
II.

ADDITIONAL CORROBORATING EVIDENCE IS NOT
REQUIRED OR NECESSARY

Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Wright's affidavit is inadequate to establish that the carereview privilege applies to any existing incident report. Pis.' Br. p. 15. Plaintiffs
specifically argue that the Hospital was required to submit additional evidence, such as
the Hospital's bylaws, rules and regulations, to corroborate the testimony of Ms. Wright.
Id. at p. 16. Plaintiffs further argue that the trial court was required to conduct an incamera review of any existing incident report. Id. at p. 17.
Despite plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, Ms. Wright's affidavit testimony
sufficiently establishes that the care-review privilege applies. The plain language of the
care-review statute does not require a health care facility to provide additional
corroborative evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1 to -3. In any event, plaintiffs in the
present case did not file a motion for an in-camera review or for additional corroborative
evidence prior to submitting their First Motion to Compel for decision. More
importantly, the trial court did not request or need additional corroborating evidence or an
in-camera review before ruling that any existing incident report is privileged.
In Utah, a trial court has discretion to conduct an in-camera review of privileged
documents but is not required to do so. Spratley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003
UT 39, ^ 22, 78 P.3d 603 (stating that a trial court may conduct in-camera review "where
appropriate"); Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund of Utah, 2003 UT App 438, ^ 25, 83
-12-

P.3d 391 (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in discovery
matters by denying the plaintiffs motion for an in-camera review). Massachusetts'
highest court has recognized that an in-camera review of incident reports "necessarily
involves an invasion and dilution of a statutory privilege" and that such a review should
be conducted only as a "last resort" when other evidence, such as affidavit testimony,
does not establish the privilege. Carr v. Howard, 689 N.E.2d 1304, 1312-1315 (Mass.
1998) (holding that affidavit testimony alone was sufficient to establish privilege).
Here, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying plaintiffs' First Motion
to Compel without conducting an in-camera review of any existing incident report or
requiring additional corroborative evidence. No motion for an in-camera review or
additional corroborative evidence was filed by plaintiffs, and other undisputed evidence,
namely the affidavit testimony of Linda Wright, establishes the privilege. Under these
circumstances, an in-camera review and/or additional corroborative evidence were not
warranted.
Because Utah's courts have addressed the issue and given trial courts discretion
with respect to in-camera reviews, case law from Texas or any other jurisdiction is not
persuasive and should be ignored. In any event, plaintiffs' reliance on Texas case law is
misplaced. First, none of the Texas cases cited by plaintiffs require the production of
bylaws or other hospital rules in addition to affidavit testimony. Mem 7 Hosp.-The
Woodlands v. McGown, 927 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Tex. 1996); In re Osteopathic Med. Ctr. of
Tex., 16 S.W.3d 881, 884 (Tex. App. 2000); Arlington Mem 'IHosp. Found., Inc. v.
Barton, 952 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. App. 1997); Northeast Cmty. Hosp. v. Gregg, 815
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S.W.2d 320, 323 (Tex. App. 1991). To the contrary, the Texas Court of Appeals has
stated that a party's duty to establish the existence of a privilege is "generally
accomplished by affidavit." In re Osteopathic Med. Or. of Tex., 16 S.W.3d at 884.
With respect to in-camera reviews, Texas has a specific rule of civil procedure that
permits but does not require such review. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.4; see also In re Ching, 32
S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. App. 2000) (stating that an in-camera review may be conducted if
the trial court determines that it "is necessary"). Moreover, an in-camera review is
required in Texas only when the party seeking discovery has introduced evidence which
counters the evidence tendered by the opposing party to establish the existence of the
privilege. Osborne v. Johnson, 954 S.W.2d 180, 185 (Tex. App. 1997).
Here, plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence in opposition to the affidavit of
Linda Wright. While plaintiffs point to a training video allegedly used by the Hospital,
that tape was not produced by the Hospital in this case, was not provided to the trial court
for review, has not been admitted into evidence by the trial court and is not included in
the record on appeal. Accordingly, the tape does not constitute evidence opposing the
affidavit of Linda Wright and should be ignored by this Court. State v. Pliego, 1999 UT
8, % 7, 974 P.2d 279 (stating that an appellate court's review is "limited to the evidence
contained in the record on appeal" (quotations and citations omitted)).
Even if the Court accepted plaintiffs' statements regarding the video tape, those
statements do not address the elements of Utah's care-review statute or in any way
contradict the affidavit testimony of Linda Wright. Even under Texas law, an in-camera
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review would not be required because plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence to
contradict the affidavit testimony of Linda Wright.
Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions otherwise, Utah law does not require additional
corroborative evidence or an in-camera review of any existing incident report. The trial
court acted within its discretion in relying on the undisputed affidavit testimony of Linda
Wright to deny plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel.
III.

CASE LAW INTERPRETING CARE-REVIEW STATUTES IN
OTHER JURISDICTIONS IS NOT PERSUASIVE OR HELPFUL

The Utah Supreme Court has concluded that information and material prepared
specifically for submission for care-review purposes is privileged. Benson, 866 P.2d at
540. Plaintiffs' reliance on case law interpreting care-review statutes that are materially
different from Utah's care-review statute is not persuasive or helpful. The North Dakota
Supreme Court has recognized that while nearly every state has a peer-review and/or a
care-review privilege statute, "it appears that no two statutes, or courts' interpretations of
them, are alike." Trinity Med. Ctr.t Inc. v. Holurn, 544 N.W.2d 148, 153 (N.D. 1996).
Accordingly, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded "because of the lack of
uniformity among the various states' peer review privilege statutes, caselaw [sic]
interpreting those statutes is not highly persuasive in our interpretation of [the North
Dakota statute]." Id.
A review of the cases cited by plaintiffs demonstrate that they are not on point.
For instance, plaintiffs rely heavily on unreported cases from Virginia. Pis.' Br., pp. 6-9.
The Virginia statute at issue in both Bradburn v. Rockingham Mem 'IHosp., 45 Va. Cir.
356, (Va. Cir. Ct. 1998), copy attached in R. at 133-137 and as Exhibit J to Addendum,
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and Benedict v. Cmty. Hosp. ofRoanoke Valley, 10 Va. Cir. 430, 1988 WL 626030, at *4
(Va. Cir. Ct. 1988), copy attached as Exhibit K to Addendum, is materially different from
the statute at issue in this case. In particular, the Virginia statute expressly excludes from
the care-review privilege records "'kept in the ordinary course of business of operating a
hospital [or] any facts or information contained in such records.5" Id. at *4 (quoting Va.
Code Ann. § 8.01-581.17 (1988)).
The court in Benedict concluded that the ordinary course of a hospital's business is
to prevent accidents or mishaps. Id. at *5. The court then determined that any document,
including incident reports, relating to the all-embracing concept of patient welfare and
safety falls within the exception to Virginia's care-review statute. Id. The court in
Benedict therefore based its analysis on the specific language of the Virginia statute.
Benedict served as the "basis" for the court's decision in Bradburn. 45 Va. Cir. Ct. at
361. Because Utah's care-review statute does not include an exception similar to the one
included in Virginia's statute, cases interpreting the Virginia statute are not on point.
Even the court in Benedict acknowledged that the incident report at issue in that case
would be privileged but for the specific exception included in the Virginia statute. Id. at
*3.
Interestingly, Virginia circuit courts have differed in their treatment of incident
reports. In a decision that is more recent than Benedict, a Virginia Circuit Court held that
a hospital's incident reports should be protected from disclosure. Mangano v.
Kavanaugh, 30 Va. Cir. 66, 1993 WL 945920, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993), copy attached as
Exhibit L to Addendum. The court in Mangano acknowledged a difference of opinion
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with respect to how broadly the Virginia privilege should be read and applied. Id. at *1.
The court in Mangano concluded that the privilege should be read broadly in accordance
with the legislature's desire to promote the exposure and frank discussion of mistakes and
mishaps. Id. at *2. Thus, even when considered against Virginia's broad exception to the
care-review privilege, incident reports have still been found to be privileged in that
jurisdiction.
In any event, case law interpreting the Virginia statute is not on point. Utah's
care-review statute does not contain an exception to the privilege for records created in
the ordinary course of business, and such an exception cannot be read into Utah's statute.
State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1998) ('"[C]ourts are not to infer substantive
terms into the text [of a statute] that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation [of
Utah's care-review statute] must be based on the language used, and the court has no
power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed." (Citation
omitted.)). Unlike the Virginia statute, Utah's care-review statute does not contain any
exceptions to the privilege.
Additional case law cited by plaintiffs is equally unhelpful because the statutes
applied in those cases are materially different from Utah's care-review statute. See, e.g.,
Cochran v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 909 F. Supp. 641, 644 (W.D. Ark. 1995)
(applying Ark. Code Ann. § 16-46-105, which expressly provides that incident reports are
not privileged); Hill v. Sandhu, 129 F.R.D. 548, 550 (D. Kan. 1990) (applying Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 65-4915, which limits the privilege to records generated by the review
committee); Porter v. Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 77, 78 (D. Kan. 1987) (applying Kan. Stat.
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Ann. § 65-2836, which limits the privilege to the records generated by the review
committee); Natl Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Sen>. ofMidwest, Inc., 800 S.W.2d
694, 701 (Ark. 1990) (applying Ark. Code Ann. § 16-46-105); Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 936 P.2d 844, 849 (Nev. 1997) (applying
Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.265, which limits the privilege to the proceedings and records
generated by the review committee); Romero v. Cohen, 679 N.Y.S.2d 264, 294 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1998) (applying N.Y. Educ. Law § 6527, which allows for discovery of
statement made by the defendant to a review committee); Trinity Med. Ctr., Inc. v.
Holum, 544 N.W.2d 148, 152-153 (N.D. 1996) (applying North Dakota statute that limits
the privilege to the records and proceedings of the review committee itself).
Plaintiffs' analogy to motor vehicle investigative reports is likewise inapplicable.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-40 (Supp. 2004), law enforcement agencies are
expressly required to disclose investigative reports to a variety of individuals and entities,
including those involved in a motor vehicle accident. Id. Furthermore, motor vehicle
investigative reports do not serve the same internal quality assurance and improvement
purposes of incident reports. For these reasons, plaintiffs' comparison between incident
reports and motor vehicle investigative reports is not valid.
The protection afforded by Utah's care-review privilege turns on the plain
language of section 26-25-3, the legislative intent behind section 26-25-3 and case law
interpreting section 26-25-3. As argued above, the undisputed evidence establishes that
any existing incident report is privileged under Utah's care-review statute and case law
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interpreting that statute. Moreover, as argued below, legislative intent and public policy
support protection of any existing incident reportfromdiscovery.
To the extent the Court is inclined to look at case lawfromother jurisdictions, a
number of jurisdictions have held that incident reports are privileged and not
discoverable. See, e.g., Romero, 679 N.Y.S.2d at 264,266-67 (recognizing that other
jurisdictions preclude or limit discovery of peer review records); William D. Bremer,
J.D., Annotation, Scope and Extent ofProt. From Disclosure ofMed. Peer Review
Proceedings Relating to Claim in Med. Malpractice Action, 69 A.L.R. 5th 559 (1999).
IV.

THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE HAS UNEQUIVOCALLY
STATED ITS INTENT TO PROTECT INCIDENT REPORTS FROM
DISCOVERY

When interpreting statutes, a court's "primary goal is to give effect to the
legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Evans v.
State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). Here, the Utah State Legislature's intent with
respect to quality assurance materials such as incident reports is unequivocal.
The care-review privilege was strengthened by the Utah State Legislature in
response to the Utah Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Benson. The statute reviewed in
Benson provided that reports "'are privileged communications and may not be used or
received in evidence in any legal proceeding of any kind or character.'" Benson, 866
P.2d at 539 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3 (1993)). In Benson, the Utah Supreme
Court concluded that the care-review privilege, as drafted by the legislature, protected
care-review information from use at trial but did not protect such materials from
discovery requests. Id. at 540. The court noted that if the legislature intended to protect
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such materials from discovery, it could have expressly done so by using such language in
the statute. Id.
In response to the Benson decision, the Utah State Legislature amended the carereview statute in 1994 to protect incident reports and other care-review materials from
discovery. Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3 (1994). Representative Melvin Brown proposed a
quality assurance amendment to section 26-25-3 clarifying that care-review materials "are
not subject to discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in any legal proceeding of any kind or
character." Rep. Brown Amend, to Sub. S.B. 158, attached as Exhibit M to Addendum.
Immediately below Representative Brown's proposed amendment was the following
handwritten note:
It is and has been the intention of the legislature that the
broadest scope of privilege, including not being subject to
discovery, has been the intention of the legislature in not
permitting the materials described above to be used or
received in evidence in any legal proceeding of any kind or
character.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
When introducing his proposed amendment on the floor of the House of
Representatives, Representative Brown stated that millions of dollars are saved by
eliminating unnecessary or inappropriate care through quality assurance activities. Utah
State House of Rep., Floor Deb. on Sub. S.B. 158, Remarks of Rep. Brown, 50th Leg.,
Gen. Sess., Day 45, March 2, 1994, Tape 1, Counter No. 1034. Representative Brown
further stated that its was in the "public interest for these [quality assurance] activities to
occur to the maximum extent possible and that they [will not] be if people [are not]
protected from discovery." Id. (Emphasis added.) Representative Brown concluded by
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reiterating that it was the legislature's intent that quality assurance activities not be
subject to discovery. Id. No representative spoke against Representative Brown's
proposed amendment. Id. The amendment was passed by both houses of the legislature
and signed into law by the governor. Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-3 (1994).
The 1994 amendment to section 26-25-3 is the determinitive law in this case. In
passing the 1994 amendment, the legislature could not have been more clear in signaling
its intent that quality assurance materials are not subject to discovery. The Court should
give effect to the legislature's intent by affirming the trial court's Order denying
plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel.
V.

PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS PROTECTION OF INCIDENT
REPORTS

The Utah Supreme Court has echoed the public policy concerns expressed by
Representative Brown. In Benson, the court recognized that the purpose of the carereview statute is to provide information that may be used to evaluate and improve medical
care provided to patients. 866 P.2d at 539. The court also recognized that in the absence
of the privilege, "personnel might be reluctant to give such information, and the accuracy
of the information and the effectiveness of the studies would diminish greatly." Id.
Protecting incident reports from discovery is necessary to ensure the candid feedback that
is required to accomplish the purposes of the care-review statute.
VI.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE ARE AVAILABLE THROUGH NONPRIVILEGED SOURCES

Plaintiffs would have the Court believe that they do not have access to the facts of
this case. Pis.' Br., p. 11. Plaintiffs' argument simply does not hold up under scrutiny.
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First, plaintiffs have all of Mr. Cannon's medical records at their disposal. Second, the
Hospital has disclosed the identities of all Hospital employees known to have
discoverable information regarding the facts of this case, including knowledge about
Mr. Cannon's alleged fall. R. at 35-39, 176-178. Significantly, plaintiffs have failed to
depose any of these individuals even though nearly two years have passed since the case
was commenced.
Plaintiffs cannot be heard to complain about stale evidence and alleged holes in the
medical records when they have not bothered to depose Hospital employees who have
discoverable knowledge about the facts of the case. Rather than work up their case
through permissible avenues of discovery, plaintiffs have instead chosen to spend their
time and resources in pursuit of what could aptly be described as a crusade to circumvent
the care-review privilege. Plaintiffs' attempt to cast themselves as somehow
disadvantaged in the discovery process is not supported by the facts.
VII. THE ALLEGED TRAINING VIDEO SUPPORTS APPLICATION OF
THE CARE-REVIEW PRIVILEGE
As already pointed out, the training video allegedly used by the Hospital was not
produced in this case, was not provided to the trial court for review, has not been admitted
into evidence by the trial court and is not part of the record on appeal. For all of these
reasons, the Court should not consider any arguments pertaining to the video. In any
event, the video actually supports the privilege that shields any existing incident report
from discovery. As alleged by plaintiffs, the video instructs that all circumstances and
findings regarding a patient's fall should be documented in both the patient's medical
chart and an incident report. Pis.' Br., p. 19.
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A patient's medical records are discoverable and have been provided to plaintiffs
in this case.2 Thus, the facts surrounding a patient's fall are not hidden and suppressed
but rather disclosed in the patient's medical records. Likewise, the facts contained in
Mr. Cannon's medical records can be supplemented and further understood through
depositions of those individuals who were involved in providing care to Mr. Cannon.
Because the basic facts surrounding a patient's fall are obtainable through non-privileged
sources, incident reports should be fully protected, as intended by the Utah State
Legislature.
Incident reports are not part of a patient's medical records and are created for the
limited purpose of allowing a hospital to assess and improve the health care provided to
patients. R. at 79,fflf7-8; Exhibit C. Plaintiffs' attempt to read an exception into the
care-review statute for factual materials that may be contained in an incident report is not
supported by the plain language of the statute, not supported by the legislative intent and
public policy behind the statute and not necessary given the availability of factual
information from non-privileged sources.
VIII. PLAINTIFFS' NEGLIGENCE CLAIM IS NOT ABROGATED BY
THE CARE-REVIEW PRIVILEGE
Plaintiffs cite case lawfromother jurisdictions in support of their argument that
competing interests in this case should be resolved in favor of disclosure. Pis.' Br., pp.

2

Mr. Cannon's medical records are not part of the record on appeal. While the
Hospital disputes plaintiffs' accusations regarding the completeness of Mr. Cannon's
medical records, the Court should ignore any arguments pertaining to the substance of
those records. Pliego, 1999 UT 8 at f 7 (stating that an appellate court's review is
"limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal" (quotations and citations
omitted)).
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11-15. The cases cited by plaintiffs are not on point. The plaintiff in Greenwood v.
Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987), asserted a claim against the hospital alleging that
it failed to properly investigate, certify or review a physician's surgical skills and the
procedure he performed on the plaintiff. Id. at 1081.
The issue in Greenwood was whether the plaintiff was entitled to hospital records
concerning the physician's privileges and credentialing. Id. at 1082. The court in
Greenwood held that denying the plaintiff access to those records by virtue of the peerreview privilege would be tantamount to denying a cause of action against hospitals for
negligence in credentialing physicians and maintaining qualified medical personnel. Id.
at 1087. The court refused to construe the statute at issue in Greenwood so broadly when
the legislature had not expressly done so in the language of the statute. Id. at 1088.
Likewise, Adams v. St. Francis Reg'IMed. Ctr., 955 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1998), involved a
situation in which the plaintiffs had no other way to develop the facts of the case without
access to the documents at issue. Id. at 1180.
As pointed out previously, plaintiffs in the present case have access to the facts
involving the care provided to Mr. Cannon, including the facts surrounding his alleged
fall, through non-privileged sources. Plaintiffs' failure to mine discoverable sources of
information about the case is no one's fault but their own, This case has been pending for
nearly two years. During that time, plaintiffs have chosen not to take any depositions to
supplement the evidence contained in the medical records concerning Mr. Cannon's
alleged fall or the treatment and care provided to Mr. Cannon in general. Because neither
plaintiffs' malpractice claim nor access to the facts surrounding that claim have been
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abrogated by the care-review privilege, the concerns addressed in Greenwood and Adams
do not apply.
Likewise, case law cited by plaintiffs that addresses the scope of the presidential
privilege is not applicable. Pis.' Br., pp. 13-15. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94
S. Ct. 3090 (1974) is distinguishable from the present case. First, Nixon addressed the
scope of a privilege in the context of a criminal prosecution and not a civil case involving
claims of negligence. Id. at 683, 94 S. Ct. at 3095. In a criminal case, constitutional
considerations arise that do not apply in a civil case. See, e.g., State v. One 1980
Cadillac, 2001 UT 26,1f 14, 21 P.3d 212 (stating that Sixth Amendment right to confront
accusers and to have assistance of counsel applies in criminal prosecutions but not in civil
in rem proceedings). In Nixon, the Supreme Court cited concerns about the Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses in a criminal case and carefully noted that its
decision was limited to balancing the competing interests in a criminal matter. Id. at 712
n. 19,94 S.Ct. at 3109.
Second, Nixon involved interpretation of a privilege, the presidential privilege, that
is implied from the President's Article II powers but not expressly set forth or limited in
the text of Constitution. Id. at 711, 94 S. Ct. at 3109. In contrast, this case involves the
scope of an express statutory privilege in a civil matter. Case lawfromthe Supreme
Court addressing the scope of a different and implied privilege in the context of a
criminal prosecution is not relevant to the issue before the Court.
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IX.

THE HOSPITAL'S COMPLIANCE WITH A COURT ORDER IN
ANOTHER CASE IS NOT BINDING IN THIS CASE AND DOES
NOT BAR THE HOSPITAL FROM ASSERTING THE CAREREVIEW PRIVILEGE IN THIS CASE

Plaintiffs seem to imply that the Hospital's compliance with an order to compel an
incident report in another case forever precludes the Hospital from opposing a request for
an incident report in the future. The trial court's decision compelling production of an
incident report in the Adam case does constitute binding precedent on either the trial court
or this Court.
Utah law allows for a second trial court judge to revisit an issue ruled upon by
another judge when the issue is presented in a different factual or legal light or when the
second judge determines that the first judge's ruling was erroneous. Red Flame, Inc. v.
Martinez, 2000 UT 22,ffl[4-5, 996 P.2d 540. A second look at the issue of whether any
existing incident report is discoverable was warranted by the trial court in this case
because additional factual material was presented, namely the affidavit of Linda Wright,
that was not presented for review to the court in the Adam case. The trial court's ruling in
the Adam case was based on the absence of an affidavit or other evidence establishing
that incident reports are created specifically for submission for review purposes. R. at
127-29; attached as Exhibit N to Addendum.
When the same issue arose in the present case, the Hospital, who is represented by
a different lead attorney, submitted the affidavit of Linda Wright in support of its
opposition to plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. R. at 78-80; Exhibit C. The affidavit
testimony of Linda Wright establishes that incident reports are in fact prepared
specifically for care-review and quality assurance purposes. R. at 79,fflf4, 7; Exhibit C.
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The Hospital has consistently opposed requests for production of incident reports. Just
because the Hospital complied with an order compelling production of an incident report
in the Adam case does not mean that the Hospital picks and chooses when to "hide
behind" the care-review privilege. Pis.' Br., p. 21.
The Hospital has consistently and correctly relied on the care-review statute for
protection of incident reports from discovery, regardless of whether the information
contained in them is favorable. Because the plain language of the care-review statute,
case law interpreting that statute, legislative history and public policy all support the
protection of incident reports from discovery, the trial court's Order denying plaintiffs'
First Motion to Compel should be affirmed.
X.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY AND
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS ON THOSE MOTIONS ARE NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT

This Court granted plaintiffs' petition for permission to appeal the trial court's
order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. The sole issue presented by plaintiffs'
petition is whether any existing incident report is discoverable. Exhibit E. Subsequent to
the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel, plaintiffs filed two additional
motions to compel discovery related to any existing incident report, and the Hospital filed
a motion to stay all discovery related to any existing incident report pending resolution of
this appeal. R. at 215-30, 375-406. The trial court has ruled on one of those three
motions. R. at 347-48; Exhibit F. The two remaining motions are fully briefed,
submitted and under review by the trial court.
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None of the three motions filed subsequent to the trial court's denial of plaintiffs'
First Motion to Compel are properly before the Court because (1) the Court granted
plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory appeal for the limited purpose of reviewing the trial
court's denial of plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel; and (2) the trial court has not yet
ruled on two of the three motions pertaining to additional discovery related to any
existing incident report. State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, % 9, 992 P.2d 986 (limiting the
court's review to issues presented in the petition for interlocutory appeal); Brumley v.
Utah State Tax Comm % 868 P.2d 796, 802 (Utah 1993) (affirming that Utah's appellate
courts serve a "limited function" of reviewing "orders and judgments made by the trial
court in the first instance").
Furthermore, only a small portion of the briefing completed on the two pending
motions is included in the record on appeal. The Court should decline plaintiffs'
invitation to address issues and motions that are not included in the record on appeal.
Pliego, 1999 UT 8, at f 7 (stating that an appellate court's review is "limited to the
evidence contained in the record on appeal" (quotations and citations omitted)). Finally,
this Court has previously denied plaintiffs' motion for an order compelling additional
discovery pertaining to any existing incident report. Exhibit I. There is no need for the
Court to revisit the issue. For all of these reasons, the Court should not consider
plaintiffs' arguments or requests for relief pertaining to additional discovery related to
any existing incident report.
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CONCLUSION
The undisputed affidavit testimony of Linda Wright establishes that the carereview privilege applies to any existing incident report and that all statutory and case law
requirements pertaining to the care-review privilege have been satisfied. No additional
corroborative evidence or an in-camera review of any existing incident report is required
under the law, and such additional measures were not requested by the trial court. The
trial court acted well within its discretion in denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel on
the basis of the undisputed testimony of Linda Wright.
Both legislative intent and public policy support and require protection of incident
reports from discovery. Plaintiffs have access to the facts of the case, including those
surrounding Mr. Cannon's alleged fall, through non-privileged sources of discovery. The
protection of any existing incident report from discovery will not prejudice plaintiffs'
efforts to discover the facts of the case or abrogate their cause of action for negligence
against the Hospital. Because issues pertaining to additional discovery related to any
existing incident report are not properly before the Court, arguments pertaining to
additional discovery related to any existing incident report should not be considered.
For these reasons, the trial court's Order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to
Compel should be affirmed, and the case should be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this
2004:

Douglas G. Mortensen
Attorney for Plaintiffs
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
David W. Slagle
Elizabeth L. Willey
Bradley R. Blackham
Attorneys for Defendant
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

day of March,
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state, shall immediately report to a law enforcement agency
regarding the injury.
(b) The report shall state the name and address of the inj
if known, the person's whereabouts, the character and extent?
person's injuries, and the name, address, and telephone m
person making the report.
(2) A health care provider may not be discharged, suspended, disci]
harassed for making a report pursuant to this section.
(3) A person may not incur any civil or criminal liability as a
making any report required by this section.
(4) A health care provider who has personal knowledge that the
wound or injury has been made in compliance with this section is
further obligation to make a report regarding that wound or injury
section.
History: C. 1953, 26-23a-2, enacted by L.
1988, oh. 238, 8 2; 1996, ch. 23, 9 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-

26-23a-3.

ment, effective April 29,1996,
section (1) and rewrote Subsection
Subsection (4); and made stylistic

Penalties.

Any health care provider who intentionally or knowingly
provision of Section 26-23a-2 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 26-23a-3, enacted by L.
1988, eh. 238, fi 3.

Cross-Referenees. — Sentencing
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-30|.

CHAPTER 24
LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT ACT
[RENUMBERED]
26-24-1 to 26-24-24.

Renumbered.

Renumbered. — Laws 1990, ch. 186,
§§ 889 to 913 renumbered this chapter as
§§ 17A-3-501 to 17A-3-526, effective April 23,

1990. Sections 17A-3-501 to 17A-3-624
renumbered again as §5 26A-1-101 et
1991.

CHAPTER 25
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
RELEASE
Section
26-25-1.

26-25-2.
26-25-3.

Authority to provide data on treatment and condition of persons
to designated agencies — Immunity from liability.
Restrictions on use of data.
Information considered privileged
communications.

Section
26-25-4.
26-25-5.
26-25-6.
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Information held in coi
Protection of identities. ,;;
Violation of chapter a
meanor — Civil liability, y
Repealed.

26-25-1

^0*25-1. Authority to provide data on treatment and condition of persons to designated agencies — Immunity from liability.
(1) Any person, health facility, or other organization may, without incurring
bjlity, provide the following information to the persons and entities de1 in Subsection (2):
(a) information as determined by the state registrar of vital records
appointed under Title 26, Chapter 2;
(b) interviews;
(c) reports;
(d) statements;
(e) memoranda; and
(f) other data relating to the condition and treatment of any person.
(2) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided to:
(a) the department and local health departments;
(b) the Division of Mental Health within the Department of Human
Services;
(c) scientific and health care research organizations affiliated with
institutions of higher education;
(d) the Utah Medical Association or any of its allied medical societies;
(e) peer review committees;
(f) professional review organizations;
(g) professional societies and associations; and
(h) any health facility's in-house staff committee for the uses described
m Subsection (3).
(3) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided for the
following purposes:
(a) study, with the purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality; or
(b) the evaluation and improvement of hospital and health care rendered by hospitals, health facilities, or health care providers.
f4) Any person may, without incurring liability, provide information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other information relating to the
ethical conduct of any health care provider to peer review committees,
professional societies and associations, or any in-hospital staff committee to be
$sed for purposes of intraprofessional society or association discipline.
{$) No liability may arise against any person or organization as a result of:
(a) providing information or material authorized in this section;
(b) releasing or publishingfindingsand conclusions of groups referred
to in this section to advance health research and health education; or
(c) releasing or publishing a summary of these studies in accordance
with this chapter.
BJ As used in this chapter:
(a) "health care provider" has the meaning set forth in Section 78-14-3;
«nd
(b) "health care facility" has the meaning set forth in Section 26-21-2.
Pffiatory: C. 1958, 26-85-1, enacted by L.
Repeals and Beenactiftenta. — Laws
pttVch. 126, i 24; 1868, eh. 180, S 1; 1989, 1981, ch. 126, § 1 repealed former §§ 26-25-1
ca. 142, $ 1; 1990, ch. 93, * 15; 1990, ch. 114, to 26-25-5 (L. 1967, ch. 48, §§ 1 to 5; 1969, ch.
I H ; 1990, eh. 188, fi 10; 1992, ch. 240, S 2; 197,55 76 to 79), the Radiation Protection Act.
W W u 201, fi 18.
Present $$ 26-25-1 to 26-25-6 were enacted by
241
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§ 24 of the act For present provisions regulating radiation sources, see § 19-3-301 et seq
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection
(l)(a) deleted former language pertaining to
health information required for birth certificates, m Subsection (2Xa) added "and local
health departments", and in Subsection (2Xd)
substituted "Utah Medical Association" for

"Utah State Medical Association "
Cross-References. — Attorney of j
access to medical records, § 78-25-25.
Child abuse reporting requirements, § {
4a-401 et seq
Medical examiner's records, § 26-4-17.
Physician-patient privilege, § 78-24-8.
State hospital mental health records, <
dentiahty, § 62A-12-247.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Limitation on privilege.
The purpose of statutes providing the "care
review* privilege is to improve medical care by
allowing health-care personnel to provide information to evaluate and improve hospital and

health care, and only documents prepared «
cifically for review purposes are privileged, {
documents that might or could be used m j
review process Benson ex rel Benson v. ]
Hosps, 866 P.2d 537 (Utah 1993)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
m Utah Law — Legislative Enactments —
Health Law, 1990 Utah L Rev. 261.

AJL.R. — Patient's right to disclosure of
or her own medical or hospital records,*
A.L R4th 701

26-25-2. Restrictions on use of data.
The Division ot Mental Health within the Department ot Human Sei
scientific and health care research organizations affiliated with institul
higher education, the Utah Medical Association or any of its allied
societies, peer review committees, professional review organizations,
sional societies and associations, or any health faculty's in-house staff
tee may only use or publish the material received or gathered under
26-25-1 for the purpose of advancing medical research or medical education
the interest of reducing morbidity or mortality, except t h a t a summary
studies conducted in accordance with Section 26-25-1 may be released by
groups for general publication.
History: C. 1953, 26-25-2, enacted by L. ment, effective April 29, 1996, sul
1981, ch. 126, 8 24; 1888, ch. ISO, S 2; 1990, "Utah Medical Association" for "Utah
ch. 188, 4 11; 1996, ch. 201, § 14.
Medical Association" and made
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- change

26-25-3. Information considered privileged commiiniraH
tions.
All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other dati|
furnished by reason of this chapter, and any findings or conclusions resultbifl
from those studies are privileged communications and are not subject tjj
discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in any legal proceeding of any kind fll
character.
History: C. 1953, 26-25-3, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, i 24; 1989, ch. 142, » 2; 1994,
ch. 314,ft3; 1996, ch. 201, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "are

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION RELEASE
information required on birth certificates as
determined by the state registrar of vital
records
NOTES TO DECISIONS

limitation on privilege.
The purpose of statutes providing the "care

cifically for review purposes are privileged, not
documents that might or could be used in the
review process Benson ex rel Benson v. I.H.C
Hosps , 866 P 2d 537 (Utah 1993).
Waiver of privilege.
Hospital's inclusion in same documents of

review" privilege is to improve medical care by

both privileged and nonpnvxleged materials did

allowing health-care personnel to provide information to evaluate and improve hospital and
health care, and only documents prepared spe-

not waive the privilege as to all of them Benson
ex rel Benson v. I.H.C. Hosps., 866 P.2d 537
(Utah 1993)

ANALYSIS

Limitation on privilege
Waiver of privilege

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AXJL — Discovery of hospital's internal
records or communications as to qualifications

or evaluations of individual physician, 81
A.L R 3d 944.

26-25-4. Information held in confidence — Protection of
identities.
(1) All mlormataon, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other
data provided to a person or organization under this chapter shall be held in
strict confidence by that person or organization, and any use, release, or
publication resulting therefrom shall be made so as to preclude identification
of any individual or individuals studied.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the department's disclosure of information under this chapter is governed by Chapter 3 of this title.
History: C. 1953, 96-35-4, enacted by L.
1981, eh. 126, § 24; 1989, ch. 142, 5 3; 1996,
eh. 201, § 16.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, added Subsection (2); added the Subsection (1) designation,

in Subsection (1) deleted former language pertaining to health information required for birth
certificates as determined by the state registrar
of vital records, and made stylistic and related
changes.

26-25-5. Violation of chapter a misdemeanor — Civil liability.
(1) Any use, release or publication, negligent or otherwise, contrary to the
provisions of this chapter shall be a class B misdemeanor.
(2) Subsection (1) shall not relieve the person or organization responsible for
such use, release, or publication from civil liability.
History: C. 1958, 26-25-6, enacted by L.
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde1981, ch. 126, S 24; 1991, ch. 241,ft19.
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

not subject to discovery, use, or receipt in I
dence" for "may not be used or receivi "
evidence" near the end of the section.
The 1996 amendment, effective April 1
1996, deleted language pertaining to I
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EXPERIMENTAL ANIMALS

26-25-6. Repealed.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Repeals. — Laws 1996, ch. 201,fi21 repeals
§ 26-25-6, aa enacted by Laws 1989, ch 25, § 2,
concerning confidentiality requirements re-

garding communicable or reportable
effective April 29,1996.

CHAPTER 25a
CONFIDENTIAL COIVIMUNICABLE
DISEASE INFORMATION
[RENUMBERED]
26-25a-101 to 26-25a-104. Renumbered.
Renumbered. — Laws 1996, ch. 201, §§ 9 to
12 renumbered §§ 26-25a-101 to 26-25a-104,
relating to confidential communicable disease

information, as §5 26-6-27 to 26-6-30, efl
April 29, 1996.

CHAPTER 26
EXPERIMENTAL ANIMALS
Section
26-26-1
26-26-2
26-26-3

26-26-4

"Institution" denned.
Authorization for institutions to
obtain impounded animals.
Period of impoundment and effort
to find owner prerequisite to delivery of animals to institution
by governing body of county or
municipality — Owner's prerogative regarding provision of

Section
26-26-4.
26-26-5.
26-26-7.

animal to an inj
Institution to pay trans]
expense — Restrictions
of animals — Fee.
Records of animals required*
Revocation of authorization*.
Adoption of rules by dej
— Inspection and inv<
of institutions.

26-26-1. "Institution" defined.
As used in this chapter, "institution" means any school or college i$
agriculture, veterinary medicine, medicine, pharmacy, dentistry or otbm
educational, hospital or scientific establishment properly concerned with tnfj
investigation of or instruction concerning the structure or functions of livings
organisms, the cause, prevention, control or cure of diseases or abnormal
condition of human beings or animals.
History: C. 1953, 26-26-1, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126,ft25.
Repeals and Reettactments. — Laws
1981, ch 126, § 1 repealed former §§ 26-26-1
to 26-26-8 (h 1969, ch 64, §§ 1 to 3), the
Anatomical Gift Act. Present §§ 26-26-1 to 2626-7 were enacted by § 25 of the act. For the

Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, Bee Chapter S&efi
this title.
Cross-References. — City pounds, § K M
64.
Cruelty to animals as misdemeanor, 8
301.
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journal ot Energy Law and Policy. —
IMJB Found Seizure Controversy. A Suggested
nempronuse in the Use of Impounded Animals
cTfkeearch and Education, U J. Energy L. &
pjl«y 241 (1991).

Cages and Codes: The Debate Over the Use of
Laboratory Animals, 11 J. Energy L. & Pol'y
319 (1991).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Animals 6 43.
C J J 3 . — 3A C J.S. Animals § 342.

g$-26-2. Authorization for institutions to obtain impounded animals.
Institutions may apply to the department for authorization to obtain
gnjipnlB from establishments maintained for the impounding, care and disposal of flpir"»i« seized by lawful authority. If, after investigation, the
departmentfindsthat the institution meets the requirements of this chapter
and its rules and that the public interest will be served thereby, it may
authorize the institution to obtain animals under this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 26-26-2, enacted by L.
1961, ch. 126, 5 25.

26-26-3. Period of impoundment and effort to find owner
prerequisite to delivery of animals to institution
by governing body of county or municipality —
Owner's prerogative regarding provision of animal to an institution.
The governing body of the county or municipality in which an establishment
is located shall make available to an authorized institution as many impounded animals in that establishment as the institution may request;
provided, however, that such animals shall have been legally impounded at
least five days or for such other minimum period as may be specified by
municipal ordinance, and remain unclaimed and unredeemed by their owners
or by any other person entitled to do so. The establishment shall first make a
reasonable effort tofindthe rightful owner of such animal, and if the owner is
not found, shall make a reasonable effort to make the animal available to
others during the impound period. Owners of animals who voluntarily provide
their animals to an establishment may, by signature, determine whether or not
the animal may be provided to an institution or used for research or
educational purposes.
History: C. 1958, 26-26-3, enacted by L.
1961, ch. 126, 5 25; 1969, ch. 80, 5 1.

26-26-4. Institution to pay transportation expense — Restrictions on use of animals — Fee.
The authorized institution shall provide, at its own expense, for the
transportation of such animalsfromthe establishment to the institution and
shall use them only in the conduct of scientific and educational activities and
for no other purpose. The institution shall reimburse the establishment for
animals received. The fee shall be, at a minimum, $15 for cats and $20 for dogs.
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Exhibit C

DAVID W. SLAGLE - A2975
ELIZABETH L. WHXEY - A5639
BRADLEY R. BLACKHAM A8703
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KATHERYN CANNON, as surviving spouse
of GARY R. CANNON, deceased, LANE
CANNON and ROLAND CANNON, as
surviving children and legal heirs of GARY R.
CANNON, deceased,

AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA WRIGHT
Civil No. 020914614
Judge Judith S.H. Atherton

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES 1
THROUGH X AND DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Linda Wright being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1.

I am the Risk Manager in the Quality Assurance Department at Salt Lake

Regional Medical Center, and I am personally familiar with the facts and matters herein set forth.
2.

The Quality Assurance Department is charged by the Medical Executive

Committee at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center with responsibility for collecting and
evaluating unusual occurrence reports (also known as incident reports) for the purpose of
assessing, evaluating and improving the quality of health care rendered to patients at Salt Lake
Regional Medical Center.
3.

The Quality Assurance Department requires staff at Salt Lake Regional Medical

Center to fill out incident reports for all unusual occurrences.
4.

Incident reports are created specifically for submission to the Quality Assurance

Department at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center.
5.

The Quality Assurance Department reviews all incident reports created for the

specific purpose of evaluating and improving the health care rendered to patients at Salt Lake
Regional Medical Center.
6.

Incident reports are necessary and critical to the care-review work performed by

the Quality Assurance Department.
7.

Incident reports are not created or used for any purpose other than for evaluating

and improving the health care rendered to patients at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center.
8.

Incident reports are not included as part of a patient's medical records.

AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA WRIGHT PAGE 2

9.

Incident reports do not constitute routine business or medical records of Salt Lake

Regional Medical Center.
DATED this

/ 7 day of

lyfitflrflhtr, 2003.

-Jbilicia Wright

?/&*&-

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J2_ day of N/)/&nb*r

, 2003.

a
R^idin^lc ^122 hL Mmr,
My Commission Expires:

7/5/05
O \20440\51\PLEADING\Afiidavit Linda Wnghtwpd

AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA WRIGHT PAGE 3

/ $ALP

West Jordan Utah W%$
NOTARY PUBLIC
GINA L. MILLER
4722 WHELENIC LANE
WC<5T JORDAN, UT8408S
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
FEBRUARY 5, 2005
STATE OF UTAH

Exhibit D

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KATHERYN CANNON, as surviving
spouse of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased, LANE CANNON and
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving
children and legal heirs of
GARY R. CANNON, deceased,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO.

020914614

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE
DOES 1 THROUGH X, and DOE
BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,
Defendants.

The Court is in receipt today of a letter from plaintiffs1
counsel, dated March 18, 2004.

Due to court error, the copies of

the Minute Entry denying plaintiffs1 Motion to Compel signed and
entered March 4, 2 004, were sent to counsel, undated. To preserve
plaintiffs1 right to file an interlocutory appeal, the Court now
enters the Order denying plaintiffs1 Motion to Compel on May 21,
2004.

Plaintiffs1 counsel need not prepare a final Order.

Dated this l\

day of May, 2004.

./^**7'\

CANNON V. SALT LAKE
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE 2

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this Z y ^ d a y of May,
2004:

Douglas G. Mortensen
Attorney for Plaintiffs
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
David W. Slagle
Elizabeth L. Willey
Attorneys for Defendant
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

-1*4
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Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

(801)363-2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KATHERYN CANNON, as surviving
spouse of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased, LANE CANNON and
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving children
and legal heirs of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X and DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,

PETITION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
(Subject to Assignment
to the Court of Appeals)
Case No.
Third Judicial District Court
Civil No.: 020914614
Judge: Judith Atherton

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 5, U.R.A.P., Plaintiffs/Petitioners Katheryn, Lane and Roland
Cannon hereby petition the Utah Supreme Court to permit an interlocutroy appeal from
the order of the Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton entered on May 21, 2004. The district

court's Minute Entry was signed on May 21,2004. A copy of that Minute Entry is
attached hereto as EXHIBIT "A". That minute entry finalized a minute entry which had
been mailed to plaintiffs' counsel, unsigned and undated in early March, 2004. A copy
of the unsigned, undated March Minute Entry is attached hereto as EXHIBIT "B".

I.
CONCISE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

During the early morning of May 18, 2001, patient Gary Cannon sustained

a subdural hematoma from a fall in his hospital room on Unit 4C of Salt Lake Regional
Hospital. Three days later, he died from this injury. On the day the incident occurred,
incident reports were prepared by members of the nursing staff.
2.

On December 17,2002, plaintiffs submitted in formal discovery a request

for "each 'incident report' and other documentation of Mr. Cannon's fall during the early
morning hours of May 18, 2001."
3.

On February 24, 2003, the Hospital formally refused to honor this request,

claiming the information sought to be protected by care review privilege found in UCA
§26-25-3.

-2-

4.

On October 24, 2003, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production of the

incident reports. On November 17, 2003, the Hospital filed a memorandum in
opposition to the motion and on December 5,2003, the plaintiffs filed a reply
memorandum supporting their motion. After holding the matter under advisement for
several months, the district court issued its ruling denying plaintiffs' motion to compel
production of the incident reports.
5.

The district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion was based entirely on a

conclusory assertion in an affidavit of the hospital's risk manager that the incident
reports were "not created or used for any purpose other than for evaluating or improving
. . . health care." The district court stated: "in the absence to any evidence to the
contrary, this Court finds that the reports are privileged."
6.

Immediately following the district court's denial of their motion, plaintiffs

undertook additional discovery to test the accuracy of the assertion of the hospital's risk
manager. They attempted to depose the risk manager and to depose all persons with
knowledge or information as to the identity of persons who have seen the incident
reports. (See Exhibits "C" and "D", attached). Plaintiffs also served two requests for
admissions and two interrogatories seeking admission that the attorneys defending the
hospital in this action have seen the incident reports. The hospital has refused to
cooperate in any of these discovery efforts. (See Exhibits "E" and "F", attached).

-3-

A

motion to compel is pending1.

II.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue sought to be reviewed is whether a hospital's factual incident reports,
created contemporaneously with an event causing injury to a patient, are discoverable.
Evidence that this issue was preserved in the district court may be found in the district
court's May 21,2004 Minute Entry (Exhibit "A", attached) in which the district court
states:
To preserve plaintiffs' right to file an interlocutory appeal, the
Court now enters the Order denying plaintiffs' motion to
compel on May 21, 2004. Plaintiffs' counsel need not
prepare a final Order.

1

This second motion to compel was submitted for decision on April 2, 2004.
UCA §78-7-25(1) provides:
A judge of a trial court shall decide all matters submitted for
final determination within two months of submission, unless
circumstances causing the delay are beyond the judge's
personal control.
Despite this statute, no decision has yet been issued. The briefs pertaining to this
pending motion to compel discovery are attached hereto as Exhibits "G, H, I, J."
-4-

III.
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court's decision that the incident reports are privileged was a
conclusion of law (based on the district court's interpretation of UCA §26-25-3) which
must be reviewed for correctness, without according any deference to the district court's
ruling. See Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 977 P.2d 1201,1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor EX
REL CT v. Johnson. 977 P.2d 479,480 (Utah 1999); and Truiillo v. Jenkins. 840 P.2d
777, 778-79 (Utah 1992).

IV.
WHY AN IMMEDIATE INTERLOCUTORY
APPEAL SHOULD BE PERMITTED.
The incident reports plaintiffs seek were written by persons with first-hand
knowledge and clear recollection of the event on the very day it occurred. They are
factual in nature. They contemporaneously record important information concerning
when the patient fell, when and by whom he was discovered and what observations
were made concerning his position, location and condition after his fall. They also may
include accurate reporting of when various care providers arrived on the scene to begin
assisting in the patient's care.

-5-

Due to prelitigation requirements governing health care malpractice claims in
Utah, plaintiffs are denied opportunity to obtain statements from key hospital employees
until long after an event has occurred. By the time a plaintiff discovers which hospital
employees have knowledge or information of what happened, memories have grown
dim or become non existent.
In this case, only the hospital and its representatives have possession of the key
facts concerning the injury which caused the death of patient Gary Cannon. Over three
years have elapsed since the patient's death. It is likely that when care providers on
duty at the time of Mr. Cannon's fall are identified and deposed, they will claim they no
longer have recollections of what occurred. The only accurate indications of what
occurred are contained in the incident reports. Although the patient's hospital chart has
been produced, its entries relating to the patient's fall are terse, unclear and, in some
respects, inconsistent.
Plaintiffs' counsel is aware of no Utah authority declaring factual incident reports
either non discoverable or privileged. Courts in other jurisdictions have found such
incident reports to be fully discoverable and not privileged. In a medical negligence
suit, all parties should have access to the same factual information. Factual information
contained in basic incident reports should not be declared protected by Utah's carereview privilege statute. Hospitals should not be allowed to hide basic factual
information behind the cloak of a peer-review statute.
-6-

There is an additional, unusual reason why production of the incident reports in
this case should be compelled. Just one day before Mr. Cannon's mishap, another
patient at this same hospital sustained injuries from an unattended fall. That patient's
injuries also proved fatal. In the suit brought by his family, a motion to compel
production of the incident reports was granted. (See Third Judicial District Court Case
No. 020910871, Adam v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Center). The hospital produced
the reports pertaining to the fall of that patient, as ordered. The fact that the hospital
produced incident reports in that case renders suspect its risk manager's bald assertion
that the incident reports in this case were created and used solely for the purposes set
forth in Utah's care review statute. Denying the plaintiffs' motion to compel in this case
renders the hospital free to pick and choose when it wishes to hide behind the privilege.
It will produce incident reports it deems favorable in one case and keep them
suppressed in another case when the facts they reveal harm its case or rebut its
defenses. The unfairness produced by inconsistent application of the privilege is
palpable.

-7-

V.
WHY THE APPEAL MAY MATERIALLY
ADVANCE TERMINATION OF THE LITIGATION.
Trial of this action without a revelation of the facts contained in the incident
reports will be essentially meaningless. Plaintiffs will be unable to ascertain the extent
to which the hospital breached the applicable standard of care without discovery of
information contained in the incident reports. Proceeding to trial will be a colossal
waste of judicial and litigant resources. On the other hand, production of the incident
reports at this juncture could lead to a prompt settlement or, alternatively, could
conceivably persuade the plaintiffs and their experts that no deviation from the standard
of care occurred and the suit should therefore be dismissed voluntarily. The incident
reports hold the key to a just outcome of this case. Determining whether those incident
reports are discoverable now will save all of the parties and the district court
considerable time and resources.

VI.
WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD DECIDE THIS CASE.
The current version of UCA §26-25-3 owes its existence to the Utah legislature's
modification of the care-review statute following this Court's decision in Benson v. IHC
Hospitals. Inc. 866 P.2d 537 (Utah 1993). In that case, this Court declared that "only

-8-

material and information prepared specifically for submission to a peer-review
committee" are subject to privilege. (866 P.2d at 540). In Benson, this Court also dealt
with another legitimate concern: that documents which should be a part of a patient's
medical record are labeled as privileged documents and removed from the medical
record. Id. It has been established through discovery in the Adam v. Salt Lake
Regional Medical Center case that nurses working at this hospital are shown a training
video entitled "Patient Falls: Panic or Prevention?." That video specifically states, with
respect to patient falls:
All circumstances and findings should be documented
in the patient's chart and on the incident report form.
It is precisely because the facts and circumstances surrounding Mr. Cannon's fall are
not documented in the patient's chart that plaintiffs seek production of the incident
reports.
Traditionally, this Court has reserved to itself the task of interpreting statutes
enacted in response to prior decisions of this Court. This is such an occasion. This
Court should retain jurisdiction and decide the appeal.
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VII.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Petitioners ask this Court to do four things:
1.

Permit their interlocutory appeal from the district court's decision denying

discovery of the hospital's incident reports concerning the decedent's unattended fall;
2.

Retain jurisdiction of this appeal rather than assign it to the Court of

Appeals for disposition;
3.

Either itself decide the pending motion to compel discovery of the facts

concerning who has seen and "used" the incident reports the hospital refuses to
produce to plaintiffs or order the district court to rule on the motion without further delay;
4.

Allow plaintiffs a limited period of time to conduct the discovery they seek

to conduct for the purpose of presenting sufficient factual information to enable this
Court to determine whether the incident reports truly were prepared solely for carereview purposes as alleged by the hospital's risk manager and whether, even if they
were, they should be shown to plaintiffs' counsel.
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of June, 2004.

4, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /d day of June, 2004,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following via the means indicated:
Elizabeth L. Willey
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11* Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

/
D
•
D
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Pldgreqforpermission to appeal. 0608
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Exhibit F

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KATHERYN CANNON# as surviving
spouse of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased, LANE CANNON and
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving
children and legal heirs of
GARY R. CANNON, deceased,

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER
CASE NO.

020914614

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE
DOES 1 THROUGH X, and DOE
BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,
Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's Motion to
Compel Discovery and for Sanctions.

This Court has reviewed the

Motion and Memoranda of the parties.
plaintiffs1

position

concerning

The Court agrees with

this

Court's

prior

ruling.

Plaintiff is entitled to depose Linda Wright.
Therefore,

plaintiffs'

Motion

to

Compel

Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions is denied.
Dated this

_day of May, 2004.

Ifork
tTHERTON

JUDGE

is

granted.

CANNON V. SALT LAKE
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE 2

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry and Order, to the following, this
of May, 2004:

Douglas G. Mortensen
Attorney for Plaintiffs
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
David W. Slagle
Elizabeth L. Willey
Attorneys for Defendant
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

'ffltf&a*!
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Exhibit G

Douglas G. Mortensen, #2329

MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244

IT*
b:&lofai

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KATHERYN CANNON, as surviving
spouse of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased, LANE CANNON and
ROLAND CANNON, as surviving children
and legal heirs of GARY R. CANNON,
deceased,

MOTION FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME WITHIN WHICH
TO FILE APPEAL BRIEF
AND
TO ALLOW ADDITIONAL
DISCOVERY
AND
SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs\Appellants,
vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X and DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,

Case No. 2:0040486-CA
Third Judicial District Court
Case No.: 020914614
Judge Judith S. Atherton

Respondents/Appellees.

I
MOTION
Pursuant to Rules 22 and 23, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Appellants Katheryn, Gary and Lane Cannon hereby move this Court for an order

allowing them to conclude discovery pertaining to the issue raised on appeal,
requiring the respondent to cooperate in such discovery and directing the district
court to compel and oversee compliance with such discovery. Appellants also
move this Court for an order extending the deadline for them to file their appeal
brief to a date thirty days from the completion of the discovery.
These motions are supported by the following memorandum.

MEMORANDUM
GERMANE FACTS
1.

The principal issue sought to be reviewed in this case is whether a

hospital's factual incident reports, created contemporaneously with an event
causing injury to a patient, are discoverable.
2.

Appellants filed their petition for permission to appeal interlocutory

order on June 10, 2004. Rule 5, URAP, required them to do so at that time. A
later filed petition would have been untimely.
3.

Unfortunately, discovery germane to the issue on appeal was not

completed at the time this Court granted appellant's petition (on June 28, 2004).
4.

The district court's denial of Plaintiff's motion to compel production of
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the incident reports was based entirely on a conclusory assertion in an affidavit of
the hospital's risk manager that the incident reports were "not created or used for
any purpose other than for evaluating or improving . . . health care." The district
court stated: "in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, this Court finds that
the reports are privileged."
5.

Immediately following the district court's denial of their motion,

Plaintiffs undertook additional discovery to test the accuracy of the assertion of the
hospital's risk manager. They attempted to depose theriskmanager and to
depose all persons with knowledge and information as to the identity of persons
who have seen the incident reports. The hospital declined to cooperate in this
discovery and Plaintiffs filed a second motion to compel. This motion to compel
was granted. However, there was some mixup in mailing the minute entry
notifying Plaintiffs of the grant of that motion. Having not received a copy of the
minute entry granting their second motion to compel, counsel for the Plaintiffs
wrote the district court on June 4, 2004 requesting a ruling on the motion. In
response, the Plaintiffs received on July 7, a minute entry dated July 6, 2004
stating:
The Motion to Compel requests that the defense be
compelled to produce for deposition Linda Wright and ail
other representatives who have information responsive to
-3-

plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6)[sic] deposition notice.
This Court ruled on plaintiffs' Motion by way of Minute Entry
and Order on May 21, 2004. At that time, the Court granted
plaintiffs' Motion to Compel....
(See Exhibit "A", attached).
6.

Before the grant of their second motion to compel, Plaintiffs had

served on the Hospital two admission requests and two interrogatories. The
Hospital declined to answer those discovery requests other than by objecting to
them. The admission requests and interrogatories asked the Hospital to admit
that its incident reports had been seen by counsel representing the Hospital in this
wrongful death action and requested the identity of every person who had seen
the incident reports. (See Exhibits "B" and "C", attached).
7.

Recently, Plaintiffs filed with the district a third motion to compel

asking that the Hospital be compelled to provide responses to the admission
requests and interrogatories and to produce their risk manager and other
employees for the requested Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. (See Exhibit "D",
attached).
8.

The Hospital has taken the position that no discovery should be

allowed during the pendency of the appeal based on the fact that appellants' relief
request in its petition for permission to appeal asks this Court to:
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Either itself decide the pending motion to
compel discovery of the facts concerning
who has seen and "used" the incident
reports the Hospital refuses to produce to
plaintiffs or order the district court to rule on
the motion without further delay.
(See p. 10 of Appellants' Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order,

H3).
9.

Unbeknownst to Plaintiffs/Appellants, the district court had already

ruled (favorably) on the motion to compel discovery. That ruling, however, did not
address the Hospital's failure to answer the admission requests and
interrogatories because that failure had not occurred at the time the motion had
been submitted.
10.

In their Petition for Permission Appeal Interlocutory Order, Appellants

expressly included the following relief request:
4.
Allow plaintiffs a limited period of time to
conduct the discovery they seek to conduct for
the purpose of presenting sufficient factual
information to enable this Court to determine
whether the incident reports truly were prepared
solely for care-review purposes as alleged by
the hospital's risk manager and whether, even if
they were, they should be shown to plaintiffs'
counsel.
(See Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, p. 10, ft4).
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I.
JUSTICE WOULD BEST BE SERVED BY ALLOWING
APPELLANTS TO CONCLUDE THE DISCOVERY
PERTAINING TO THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND DIRECTING
THE DISTRICT COURT TO SEE THAT THE DISCOVERY IS
COMPLETED.
Rule 5(a), URAP requires that an appeal from an interlocutory order be filed
within 20 days after entry of the order. Had appellants waited until they had
received appropriate responses to the outstanding discovery requests relating to
the issue on appeal, their appeal would have been time-barred. The Hospital's
refusal to produce its risk manager for deposition and to respond forthrightly to
Appellants' admission requests and interrogatories has placed Appellants
between the proverbial "rock and a hard place."
Unquestionably, this Court will be better able fairly to decide the issue on
appeal if it has before it all the relevant facts. In deciding whether the Hospital
should be compelled to produce its incident reports, it is important for this Court to
know whether the Hospital's counsel in this suit has seen those incident reports. It
is also important for this Court to know who else has seen the incident reports and
for what purposes.
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II.
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE GRANTED AN
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME WITHIN WHICH
TO FILE THEIR APPEAL BRIEF.
Appellants have been notified their appeal brief is due on September 3.
They seek an extension solely for the purpose of concluding outstanding
discovery relating to the issue on appeal. Appellants have not previously sought
or been granted an enlargement of time within which to file their appeal brief.
They ask that they be granted until 30 days after they have received the Hospital's
responses to their two admission requests and interrogatories and have deposed
the Hospital's risk manager and Rule 30(b)(6) designees to file their appeal brief.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUEST
Appellants ask this Court to direct the district court to compel the Hospital to
comply promptly with the district court's order allowing the Plaintiffs to depose the
Hospital's risk manager and Rule 30(b)(6) designees and to compel the Hospital
to respond to the Plaintiffs' two outstanding admission requests and
interrogatories. Appellants ask that a deadline be set for the completion of that
discovery. Appellants ask that they be given until 30 days after such discovery
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has been completed to file their appeal brief.
Dated this '

day of August, 2004.

^4^

Douglas G. Mortenser
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the ? day of August, 2004 I caused to be delivered via the following
method a copy of the foregoing to the following:
/
D
•
•

Elizabeth L Willey
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

LAAAAA^

U.S. Mail
Facsimile -363-0400
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express
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Exhibit H

DAVID W. SLAGLE (2975)
ELIZABETH L. WILLEY (5639)
BRADLEY R. BLACKHAM (8703)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Inc.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KATHRYN CANNON, as surviving
spouse of GARY R. CANNON, deceased,
LANE CANNON and ROLAND
CANNON, as surviving children and legal
heirs of GARY R. CANNON, deceased,
Plaintiffs,

DEFENDANT SALT LAKE
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE
APPEAL BRIEF AND TO ALLOW
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY

vs.
CaseNo.20040486-CA
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, INC., JOHN AND JANE DOES
1 THROUGH X AND DOE BUSINESS
ENTITIES 1 THROUGH V,

Third Judicial District Court
Civil No. 020914614
Judge Judith S.H. Atherton

Defendants.
Defendant Salt Lake Regional Medical Center ("Salt Lake Regional") submits the following
memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal Brief and to
Allow Additional Discovery.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This is a medical malpractice case arising from treatment and care rendered to

decedent Gary Cannon while he was a patient at Salt Lake Regional from May 16, 2001 through
May 21,2001. (Compl.)
2.

On January 6,2003, plaintiffs served their first set of interrogatories and requests for

production of documents on Salt Lake Regional. (Pis/ First Set of Interrogs. and Req. for Prod, of
Docs.)
3.

Plaintiffs' first set ofrequests for production of documents includes a request for each

incident report that may exist regarding Mr. Cannon's fall while he was a patient at Salt Lake
Regional. (Id.)
4.

On February 24, 2003, Salt Lake Regional responded to plaintiffs' first set of

interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Salt Lake Regional specifically objected
to plaintiffs' request for each incident report on the grounds of peer review and the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1 et seq. (1953 as amended). (Salt Lake Reg'l Answers to Pis. First Set
of Interrogs. and Req. for Produc. of Docs.)
5.

On October 24,2003, plaintiffs served a motion to compel production of any incident

report that may exist with respect to Mr. Cannon's fall at Salt Lake Regional. ("First Motion to
Compel"). (Pis.' First Mot. to Compel.)
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6.

On November 16, 2003, Salt Lake Regional served its memorandum in opposition

to plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. Supporting Salt Lake Regional's memorandum is the affidavit
of Linda Wright, who is the director of risk management at Salt Lake Regional. (Salt Lake Reg'l
Mem. in Opp'n to Pis.' First Mot. to Compel.)
7.

On December 5,2003, plaintiffs served a reply memorandum in support of their First

Motion to Compel and submitted the motion to the trial court for decision. Plaintiffs did not request
additional time to conduct discovery prior to submitting their First Motion to Compel for decision.
(Reply Mem. in Supp. of Pis.' First Mot. to Compel; Pis.' Not. to Submit for Decision.)
8.

On March 4, 2004, the trial court issued an unsigned and undated minute entry

("Minute Entry 1") denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. In Minute Entry 1, the trial court
acknowledged that the only evidence presented was the affidavit of Linda Wright. The trial court
ruled that in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, any existing incident reports are privileged.
(Minute Entry 1, attached as Exhibit A.)
9.

On March 15,2004, plaintiffs served requests for admission on Salt Lake Regional.

Plaintiffs specifically requested that Salt Lake Regional admit the following: (1) that any existing
incident reports have been seen by Salt Lake Regional's counsel; and (2) that any existing incident
reports have been seen by individually named attorneys representing Salt Lake Regional. (Pis.' Req.
for Admis. and Second Set of Interrogs.)
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10.

On March 15,2004, plaintiffs served their second set of interrogatories on Salt Lake

Regional. Plaintiffs specifically requested the following information: (1) the basis for any refusal
to admit the statements specified in plaintiffs' requests for admission; (2) the names of every person
having knowledge of the grounds for Salt Lake Regional's refusal to admit the statements specified
in plaintiffs' request for admission; (3) the identity of each document supporting Salt Lake
Regional's refusal to admit the statements specified in plaintiffs' request for admissions; and (4) the
names of every person who has seen any existing incident report. (Id.)
11.

On March 18,2004, plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, served a notice of deposition of the following individuals: (1) "[e]ach person who has
knowledge or information as to the identity of each person who has seen or may have seen the
incident report(s) which Salt Lake Regional Medical Center has refused to produce in this action;"
and (2) "[ejach and every person who has at any time seen the incident reports Salt Lake Regional
Medical Center has refused to produce in this action pertaining to the fall on or about May 18,2001
of patient Gary R. Cannon...." ("Rule 30(b)(6) deponents"). (Pis.' Rule 30(b)(6) Notice of Dep.)
12.

On March 18, 2004, plaintiffs also served a notice of deposition of Linda Wright.

(Pis.' Notice of Dep. of Linda Wright.)
13.

On March 19, 2004, counsel for Salt Lake Regional sent plaintiffs' counsel a letter

regarding plaintiffs' March 18, 2004 notices of depositions. Based on the trial court's ruling in
Minute Entry 1, counsel for Salt Lake Regional refused to produce either Linda Wright or the Rule
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30(b)(6) deponents without an orderfromthe trial court. (3/19/04 Willey Letter, attached as Exhibit
B.)
14.

On March 24, 2004, plaintiffs served a motion to compel the depositions of Linda

Wright and the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents ("Second Motion to Compel"). Plaintiffs argued that
Minute Entry 1 invites discovery into the accuracy of Linda Wright's affidavit testimony. (Pis.'
Second Mot. to Compel.)
15.

On March 24,2004, plaintiffs also served an objection to Minute Entry 1. Plaintiffs

specifically objected because Minute Entry 1 was not dated and signed. Plaintiffs requested that the
trial court not sign and enter Minute Entry 1 until it had resolved plaintiffs' Second Motion to
Compel. (Pis' Objection to Minute Entry 1.)
16.

On March 29,2004, counsel for Salt Lake Regional received a signed copy of Minute

Entry 1 ("Minute Entry 2") that is dated March 4,2004. (Minute Entry 2, attached as Exhibit C.)
17.

On March 31, 2004, Salt Lake Regional served its memorandum in opposition to

plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel. Salt Lake Regional argued that it reasonably relied on Minute
Entry 1 and applicable statutory and case law in refusing to produce Linda Wright and the Rule
30(b)(6) deponents for depositions. (Salt Lake Reg'l Mem. in Opp'n to Pis.' Second Mot. to
Compel.)
18.

On April 16, 2004, Salt Lake Regional responded to plaintiffs' requests for

admission. Salt Lake Regional objected to both requests for admission on the grounds of attorney
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client privilege; work product doctrine; Minute Entry 1; and the statutes and case law cited in Salt
Lake Regional's memoranda in opposition to plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel and Second Motion
to Compel. (Salt Lake Reg'l Answers to Pis.' First Set of Req. for Admis., attached as Exhibit D.)
19.

On April 16, 2004, Salt Lake Regional responded to plaintiffs' second set of

interrogatories. In response to plaintiffs' first interrogatory, Salt Lake Regional identified the
grounds for its refusal to admit the statements specified in plaintiffs' request for admissions;
identified counsel for both parties and Judge Atherton as individuals with knowledge supporting Salt
Lake Regional's refusal to admit the statements specified in plaintiffs' request for admissions; and
referred plaintiffs to Minute Entry 1 and the statutes and cases cited in Salt Lake Regional's
memoranda in opposition to plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel and Second Motion to Compel as
documents supporting Salt Lake Regional's refusal to admit the statements specified in plaintiffs'
request for admissions. (Salt Lake Reg'l Answers to Pis.' Second Set of Interrogs., attached as
Exhibit E.)
20.

On May 21, 2004, the trial court issued a minute entry ("Minute Entry 3") granting

in part Plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel. Specifically, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs "are
entitled to depose Linda Wright." Minute Entry 3 is silent with respect to plaintiffs' request for an
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order compelling the depositions of the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents.1 (Minute Entry 3, attached as
Exhibit F.)
21.

On May 21,2004, the trial court issued a separate minute entry ("Minute Entry 4")

clarifying Minute Entry 1. The trial court explained that Minute Entry 1 had been signed and entered
on March 4, 2004 but that the copies initially sent to counsel were undated and unsigned. To
preserve plaintiffs' right to file an interlocutory appeal, the trial court re-entered an order denying
plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel on May 21,2004. Minute Entry 4 did not alter the substance of
Minute Entry 1 or otherwise change the trial court's stated reasons for denying plaintiffs' First
Motion to Compel. (Minute Entry 4, attached as Exhibit G.)
22.

On June 4,2004, plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter to the trial court inquiring as to the

status of plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel. The letter reflects plaintiffs' counsel's belief that the
trial court had not yet ruled on plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel. (6/4/04 Mortensen Letter.)

*It should be noted that on plaintiffs incorrectly represent and imply in their
memorandum that the trial court ordered the depositions of the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents.
Plaintiffs acknowledged in a recent memorandum filed with the trial court that Minute Entry 3
"does not specifically grant the plaintiffs' [sic] the right to depose other representatives under
plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) motion," but they go on to argue that a subsequent minute entry dated
July 6,2004 "implies" that the trial court granted plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel as it
pertains to the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents. In their memorandum filed with this Court, however,
plaintiffs have not drawn any distinction between the trial court's actual orders and plaintiffs'
interpretation of those orders.
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23.

On June 10,2004, plaintiffs filed a petition for interlocutory appeal of the trial court's

order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. (Pis.' Pet. for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory
Order.)
24.

On June 28,2004, this Court granted plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory appeal of

the trial court's order denying plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel. (Order granting Pis.' Pet. for
Interlocutory Appeal.)
25.

On July 6,2004, the trial court issued a minute entry ("Minute Entry 5") in response

to the June 4,2004 letterfromplaintiffs' counsel regarding the status of plaintiffs' Second Motion
to Compel. In Minute Entry 5, the trial court explained that it had already ruled on plaintiffs' Second
Motion to Compel in Minute Entry 3. The Court attached a copy of Minute Entry 3 to Minute Entry
5. Minute Entry 5 did not alter the substance of Minute Entry 3. (Minute Entry 5, attached as
Exhibit H.)
26.

Plaintiffs' counsel admits that he received Minute Entry 3 by July 7,2004. (7/9/04

Mortensen Letter, attached as Exhibit I.)
27.

On July 9, 2004, plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, served their Certification of Absence of Transcript and Statement of Issues to be
Presented on Appeal. (Pis.' Cert, of Absence of Transcript and Statement of Issues to be Presented
on Appeal, attached as Exhibit J.)
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28.

Plaintiffs identified the primary issue on appeal as whether any existing incident

report is discoverable. (Id.)
29.

Plaintiffs identified a secondary issue on appeal as whether Salt Lake Regional

"should be compelled to respond to plaintiffs' discovery requests (including interrogatories and
admission requests) seeking to ascertain the identity and job description of all persons who have seen
the incident reports and the purposes for which such reports were disseminated to such persons."
(Id.)
30.

On July 16,2004, Salt Lake Regional served its Motion for Protective Order and Stay

of Discovery. Salt Lake Regional moved the trial court for an order staying all discovery relating
to the existence, substance, nature or dissemination of any existing incident report until the appeals
process is complete. (Salt Lake Reg'l Mot. for Protective Order and Stay of Disc.)
31.

The grounds for Salt Lake Regional's motion to stay discovery is that it would be

improper to permit discovery regarding any existing incident reports when the issues of (1) whether
incident reports are discoverable; and (2) whether Salt Lake Regional is required to comply with
plaintiffs' discovery requests regarding incident reports are on appeal to this Court. (Id.)
32.

On August 9, 2004, plaintiffs responded to Salt Lake Regional's Motion for

Protective Order and Stay of Discovery by filing (1) a motion with the trial court to compel
supplemental responses to plaintiffs' request for admissions and interrogatories and the depositions
of Linda Wright and the Rule 30(b)(6) deponents ('Third Motion to Compel"); and (2) the present
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motion for extension of time and an order compelling discovery before this Court. (Pis/ Third
Motion to Compel; Pis.' Mot. for Extension of Time Within Which to File Appeal Brief and to
Allow Additional Discovery and Supp. Mem.)
ARGUMENT
Under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, motions for an enlargement of time for filing
an appellate brief "are not favored." Utah R. App. P. 22(b). Furthermore, a motion for extension
of time may be granted only upon a showing of good cause. Id. Plaintiffs' request for an
enlargement so that they can conduct more discovery is not supported by good cause and goes
against the well established role of appellate courts.
I.

NEW EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL

This Court has repeatedly stated that it does not hear or consider new evidence on appeal.
InreL.M.,2001 UTApp314,Tfl6n.3,37?3dl\SS;Lyons v.Booker, 1999UTApp 172, f 2,982
P.2d 1142; State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Otteson v. Dep't of Human
Serv., Office ofSoc. Serv., 945 P.2d 170, 171 (Utah Ct App. 1997); Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874
P.2d 843, 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The Court has been stringent in applying this rule. For
example, the Court refused to consider a rape victim's affidavit testimony in which she recanted trial
testimony used to convict the defendant. Vessey, 967 P.2d at 966 (striking new testimony and
concluding that defendant failed to show that his conviction was not supported by sufficient
evidence).
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The reasons supporting a strict application of the rule against consideration of new evidence
on appeal go to the fundamental difference between trial courts and appellate courts. Trial courts
have "an advantaged position to evaluate the evidence and determine the facts." Utah Med. Prod.,
Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 1998). For this reason, trial courts "are given primary
responsibility for making determinations of fact." Am. Fork City v. Singleton, 2002 UT App 331,
f 5, 57 P.3d 1124. On the other hand, appellate courts are charged with the responsibility of
"examining the record for evidence supporting the judgment." Shioji v. Shioji, 111 P.2d 197,201
(Utah 1986).
The Utah Supreme Court explained the differing roles oftrial and appellate courts as follows:
The appellate court is entrusted with ensuring legal accuracy and
uniformity and should defer to the trial court on factual matters. It is
inappropriate for an appellate court to disregard the trial court's
findings of fact and to assume the role of weighing evidence and
making its own findings of fact.
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 19, 52 P.3d 1158 (concluding that the court of appeals "exceeded
its proper role" by finding facts beyond those found by the trial court) (quotations and citations
omitted); see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 2002 UT App 317, % 10, 57 P.3d 1111 (refusing
appellant's request to supplement the trial court's factual findings). In Bailey, the Utah Supreme
Court quoted with approval the following passagefromCorpus Juris Secundum:
The reviewing court is confined to the facts specially found by the
trial court, and the reviewing court may not makefindingsof fact for
or against appellant, and cannot consider evidence to find facts or

2

make a decision upon them or supplement the facts found by the trial
court with any additional facts
2002 UT 58 at Tf 19 (quoting 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, § 710 (1993) (alterations in original)
(footnotes omitted)).
Here, plaintiffs have appealed the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel
production of any existing incident reports. See Pis.' Pet. for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory
Order; Exhibit A (Minute Entry 1); Exhibit G (Minute Entry 4). In support of their motion for an
extension of time to file an appeal brief and for an order compelling additional discovery, plaintiffs
argue that "this Court will be better able to fairly decide the issue on appeal if it has before it all the
relevant facts." Pis.' Mot. for Extension of Time Within Which to File Appeal Br. and to Allow
Additional Discovery and Supp. Mem., p. 6. Thus, plaintiffs' request for an extension of time to file
their appeal brief is contingent upon their additional request for an order compelling discovery.
Plaintiffs' underlying request for an order compelling discovery so that they can present
supplemental evidence to this Court for consideration should be denied because new evidence may
not be considered on appeal. The only evidence presented to the trial court for consideration in
connection with plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel is the affidavit testimony of Linda Wright, which
was submitted in support of Salt Lake Regional's memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' First
Motion to Compel. See Exhibit A. Furthermore, the trial court's Minute Entry 1 clearly indicates
that the only facts considered by the court were those contained in Ms. Wright's affidavit. Id. It was
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not until after the trial court first denied plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel (hat plaintiffs sought
additional discovery.
Under well established rules of appellate court procedure, this Court may not consider
evidence other than the affidavit testimony of Linda Wright. While plaintiffs may believe other asof-yet undiscovered evidence may be relevant, this Court is not at liberty to supplement Ms.
Wright's affidavit testimony with other evidence that was not considered by the trial court; weigh
Ms. Wright's affidavit testimony against other evidence not considered by the trial court; or allow
further discovery on the appealable issues so that the appellate record may be supplemented.
Accordingly, plaintiffs' request for an order compelling discovery should be denied. Because
plaintiffs' request for an order compelling discovery is improper and should be denied, there is no
good cause for allowing plaintiffs additional time to file their appeal brief. Therefore, plaintiffs'
motion should be denied in its entirety.
II.

PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT SEEK AN ORDER COMPELLING
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO WRITTEN DISCOVERY WHEN THE
LEGALITY OF THE DISCOVERY REQUESTS IS AN ISSUE TO BE
PRESENTED AND ARGUED ON APPEAL

Plaintiffs' motion should be denied for additional reasons. First, plaintiffs' request for an
order compelling discovery is improper because the legality of plaintiffs' discovery requests is an
issue on appeal. After receiving the trial court's orders denying their First Motion to Compel and
partially granting their Second Motion to Compel, plaintiffs filed a statement of issues to be argued
on appeal. See Exhibit J. Plaintiffs identified the following secondary issue on appeal: Whether
4

Salt Lake Regional "should be compelled to respond to plaintiffs' discovery requests (including
interrogatories and admission requests) seeking to ascertain the identity and job description of all
persons who have seen the incident reports and the purposes for which such reports were
disseminated to such persons." Id. Thus, plaintiffs are appealing the very issue that is the subject
of this motion-whether Salt Lake Regional should be compelled to provide supplemental responses
to plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories and requests for admission.
Because the relief requested by plaintiffs in their motion is an issue to be decided on appeal,
it would be inappropriate for this Court to grant plaintiffs' motion before the parties have briefed and
argued the underlying merits of plaintiffs' discovery requests in their appellate briefs and during oral
argument. Underlying plaintiffs' motion and the issue on appeal is the issue of whether Salt Lake
Regional appropriately and justifiably relied on the attorney-client privilege, attorney work product
doctrine, Utah's care-review privilege and other objections in responding to plaintiffs' second set
of interrogatories and requests for admission. Because these issues are the subject of appeal and
have not yet been briefed or argued, plaintiffs' motion should be denied.
HI.

PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED

Plaintiffs' motion should also be denied because they have failed to adequately brief the
merits of the underlying discovery requests. Salt Lake Regional has raised numerous legal
objections to plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories and requests for admission, including the
attorney-client privilege, attorney work product doctrine, and the care-review privilege. See Exhibits
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D & E. Plaintiffs have wholly failed to present any argument as to whether the privileges and
objections asserted by Salt Lake Regional apply and preclude discovery of the information
requested. In the absence of any argument on the underlying merits ofplaintiffs' request for an order
to compel discovery, the request should be denied. See State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, % 11,974 P.2d
269 ("[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research." (Quotations and citations omitted)).
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOT RULED ON THE ISSUE

Plaintiffs' request for an order compelling discovery should also be denied because the trial
court has two motions pending before it on the same issue. In particular, Salt Lake Regional has
filed a motion for protective order and stay of all discovery relating to incident reports. In addition,
plaintiffs have filed a motion to compel discovery related to incident reports. As the court with the
primary responsibility for managing this case, the trial court should be permitted to rule on the
pending motions without interference from this Court. Only after the trial court has ruled on the
issues presented in the pending motions would an interlocutory review by this Court or the Utah
Supreme Court be appropriate.
V.

PLAINTIFFS CHOSE THE TIMING OF THEIR APPEAL

Plaintiffs' argument that they have been placed between a rock and a hard spot is also
without merit. This is an interlocutory appeal. Plaintiffs are the ones who chose to petition for
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appellate review of an interlocutory order while discovery remains to be conducted. After making
that choice, plaintiffs cannot now be heard to complain that more discovery needs to be completed.
Furthermore, it was plaintiffs who chose not to pursue any discovery related to incident reports prior
to moving the trial court for an order compelling the production of any existing incident reports.
Even after Salt Lake Regional submitted the affidavit of Linda Wright in opposition to plaintiffs'
First Motion to Compel, plaintiffs did not request time for additional discovery before submitting
their motion to the trial court for decision. Any difficulties that plaintiffs find themselves in with
respect to the record on appeal are of their own making and do not warrant an extension of time to
file an appeal brief or an order compelling discovery.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' request for an order compelling additional discovery should be denied because
new evidence may not be considered on appeal. Plaintiffs' motion should also be denied because
the issue presented in plaintiffs' motion is the same issue to be decided on appeal. Plaintiffs' motion
is also inadequately briefed. Furthermore, the trial court has not had an opportunity to decide the
issue. In the absence of good cause shown, plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time to file their
appeal brief and for an order compelling discovery should be denied.
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DATED this £ k

day of August, 2004.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By. ^ W & / ? f . $J*«AA***pS
David W. Sl<gle
Elizabeth W. Willey
Bradley R. Blackham
Attorneys for Salt Lake Regional Medical Center,
Inc.
020440-0051\bri)\54833.wpd
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Legal Assistant
020440-0051\brtA54833.wpd

9

Exhibit I

D & E. Plaintiffs have wholly failed to present any argument as to whether the privileges and
objections asserted by Salt Lake Regional apply and preclude discovery of the information
requested. In the absence of any argument on the underlying merits ofplaintiffs' request for an order
to compel discovery, the request should be denied. See State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, If 11,974 P.2d
269 ("[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research." (Quotations and citations omitted)).
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOT RULED ON THE ISSUE

Plaintiffs' request for an order compelling discovery should also be denied because the trial
court has two motions pending before it on the same issue. In particular, Salt Lake Regional has
filed a motion for protective order and stay of all discovery relating to incident reports. In addition,
plaintiffs have filed a motion to compel discovery related to incident reports. As the court with the
primary responsibility for managing this case, the trial court should be permitted to rule on the
pending motions without interference from this Court. Only after the trial court has ruled on the
issues presented in the pending motions would an interlocutory review by this Court or the Utah
Supreme Court be appropriate.
V.

PLAINTIFFS CHOSE THE TIMING OF THEIR APPEAL

Plaintiffs' argument that they have been placed between a rock and a hard spot is also
without merit. This is an interlocutory appeal. Plaintiffs are the ones who chose to petition for

6

appellate review of an interlocutory order while discovery remains to be conducted. After making
that choice, plaintiffs cannot now be heard to complain that more discovery needs to be completed.
Furthermore, it was plaintiffs who chose not to pursue any discovery related to incident reports prior
to moving the trial court for an order compelling the production of any existing incident reports.
Even after Salt Lake Regional submitted the affidavit of Linda Wright in opposition to plaintiffs'
First Motion to Compel, plaintiffs did not request time for additional discovery before submitting
their motion to the trial court for decision. Any difficulties that plaintiffs find themselves in with
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Norman L. Bradburn, Sr. v. Rockingham Memorial Hospital
Case No. (Law) 10636
CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA
45 Va. Cir. 356; 1998 Va. Cir. LEXIS 85
April 17, 1998, Decided
HEADNOTES:
HEADNOTE: Hospital incident reports that are mere recitations of objective facts and hospital policy and
procedures manuals that are the final result of hospital staff deliberations are not exempt from discovery
under §8.01-581.17.
JUDGES: [**1] By Judge John J. McGrath, Jr.
OPINIONBY: McGrath
OPINION: [*356]
In this medical malpractice action, Plaintiff has brought suit against Rockingham Memorial Hospital alleging
that the negligence of its employees caused him to suffer a tripartite fracture of his hip on May 9, 1994, as
the result of a fall from a hospital bed. It is the Plaintiff's contention that the staff of Rockingham Memorial
Hospital had improperly provided for his safety and security when he was placed unrestrained in a bed after
his physicians had allegedly ordered that bed restraints be used to prevent the Plaintiff from exiting his bed.
Counsel for the parties have completed most of the discovery in the case, and the matter now brought before
the Court includes the relatively narrow issues presented by the discoverability of two separate classes of
documents. First, the Plaintiff seeks certain Policies, Procedures, and Protocols of the Defendant which
specifically relate to fall prevention, vest restraints, nursing rounds, and post-incident care of patients. The
Plaintiff seeks a second class of documents which are genericaliy referred to as to the Incident Reports or
Accident Reports prepared immediately after the [**2] incident which gave rise to this cause of action.
The Defendant resists production of either of these two types of documents on the grounds that they are
privileged under § 8.01-581.17 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended. In addition, Defendant asserts
that its Policies, Procedures, and Protocols manuals are not discoverable because they are irrelevant as a
matter of law under the holding in Pullen & McCoy v. Nickens, 226 Va. 342, 310 S.E.2d 452 (1983).
[*357] An evidentiary hearing was held on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discover/ Responses. At this
hearing, the Defendant produced two witnesses and a number of exhibits in support of its contention that
both classes of documents should be and are privileged under § 8.01-581.17 of the Code of Virginia. The first
witness called by the Defendant was Mrs. Young, who is the Director of Quality Management for
Rockingham Memorial Hospital and also is a member of the Safety and Risk Management Committee of the
Hospital. She gave an overview description of how the quality control assessmenr process works at the
hospital. Her testimony was essentially that all untoward incidents which might give rise to liability which
occur within the hospital [**3] are required to be reported by staff on a form that is variously known as a
"Pink Sheet," a QCCR, or a QCR. These are the various names used for Incident Reports which are prepared
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by one or more staff members who are witnesses to or are involved in an accident. After these Incident
Reports are completed, they are either reviewed on an individual basis or they are aggregated for statistical
tracking and analysis by the various inter-disciplinary committees of the hospital which have, as part of their
function, the monitoring and promulgation of quality assurance practices.
Mrs. Young further testified that the Policies, Procedures, and Protocols of the hospital are developed by
various working committees and work their way through the inter-disciplinary committees and the medical
staff peer review committees and are eventually promulgated as Policies and Procedures by the Board of
Directors or Directing Manager upon the recommendation of the Quality Assessment and Improvement
Committee. According to Mrs. Young, the Procedures of the hospital are more detailed documents generated
for use at the department level, which lay out the specific manner in which the generalized Policies are [**4]
to be applied in day-to-day activities.
Dr. Danny A. Neal, who is the current Chairman of the Medical Executive Committee of Rockingham
Memorial Hospital, testified at length on the importance of the quality assessment and review procedures
utilized at Rockingham Memorial Hospital and more particularly as utilized by the Medical Staff. Dr. NeaPs
testimony was essentially that the various medical groups operating within the hospital and the hospital
Board of Directors and management rely heavily upon the various quaiity assurance committees that have
been established, and these committees, in turn, rely upon the unfettered access to information from
employees and medical staff members. It was Dr. Neal's testimony that, in his judgment and experience, the
materials which were generated by the staff were of better quality and more usable for quality control
purposes when the staff and employees were assured that whatever [*358] information they generated
would be free from discovery by legal process and possible use in litigation against them or their employer.
Although the record is not exactly clear on this issue, it appears that individual Incident Reports are not
always examined [**5] in detail by the Medical Executive Committee, but they are frequently utilized by the
lower echelon committees to examine trends and are a basis for statistical analysis to determine what areas
require additional attention from a quality assurance perspective.
The statutory provisions involved in this case are set forth in § 8.01-581.16 and 8.01-581.17 of the Code of
Virginia.
Section 8.01-581.17 provides that:
The proceedings, minutes, records, and reports of any (i) medical staff committee, utilization review
committee, or other committee as specified in § 8.01-581.16... together with all communications, both oral
and written, originating in or provided to such committees or entities, are privileged communications which
may not be disclosed or obtained by legal discovery proceedings unless a circuit court, after a hearing and for
good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances being shown, orders the disclosure of such proceedings,
minutes, records, reports, or communications. Nothing in this section shall be construed as providing any
privilege to hospitai medical records kept with respect to any patient in the ordinary course of business of
operating a hospital nor to [**6] any facts or information contained in such records, nor shall this section
preclude or affect discovery of or production of evidence relating to hospitalization or treatment of any
patient in the ordinary course of hospitalization of such patient.
Section 8.01-581.16 provides that the "Committees" which are covered by the privilege of § 8.01-581.17 are
"any committee, board, group, commission or other entity which functions primarily to review, evaluate,
make recommendations on... (iv) the adequacy or quality of professional services...."
Since the two classes of documents at issue in this case raise somewhat different legal issues, they will be
treated separately.
I. Discoverability of Incident Reports
The QCRs, QCCRs, or "Pink Sheets" (which hereinafter will be referred to simply as "Incident Reports") are
prepared by staff personnel whenever there is an untoward incident which occurs at the hospital. These
Incident Reports are then forwarded to various quality assurance committees. The [*359] testimonv in this
case was that such an Incident Report was prepared immediately after Mr. Bradburn had suffered nis fall by
one or more of the nurses who were attending on the [**7] ward when he was injured. No other accident or
incident report was prepared by anyone employed by the hospital.
The Defendant's position is that all of these Incident Reports are clearly privileged under the previsions of §
8.01-581.17 because they are "communications... originating in or provided to a committee, board, group,
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commission, or other entity which functions primarily to review, evaluate, or make recommendations on...
(iv) the adequacy or quality of professional services...." The Defendant contends that these Incident Reports
are an integral part of the overall quality assurance or quality assessment process that has been established
within the hospital to assure high quality medical care. In essence, the Defendant argues that these Incident
Reports are the raw material which is supplied to the various quality assurance committees to be reviewed
and to be analyzed for the purposes of maintaining or improving the quality of medical care rendered at the
hospital.
The Plaintiffs contention is that these Incident Reports are not part of the deliberative quality control process
and are not within the scope of the privilege as intended by the legislature. The Plaintiffs [**8] position is
that it was never the intention of the legislature to extend a quality assurance privilege to routine, factual
reports which record the time, place, date, witnesses, and observations relating to a particular incident. The
Plaintiffs position is that the privilege is meant to protect the give and take of the deliberative process and
the self-searching review conducted by quality control committees.
There appear to be no appellate cases in Virginia clearly articulating the metes and bounds of the privilege
set forth in § 8.01-581.17 when dealing with incident reports relating to accidents which occur in medical
facilities. There has been a substantial number of cases decided at the Circuit Court level, and they are more
or less evenly divided on the question of whether such incident reports are privileged within the meaning of §
8.01-581.17. Plaintiff points to a number of decisions which have held that incident reports such as the ones
involved in this case, even when they are supplied directly and exclusively to quality assurance or quality
control committees, are not covered by the privilege because they do not contain any of the normal
deliberative processes which [**9] the legislature intended to protect in the statute. See, e.g., Huffman v.
Beverly Calif. Corp., 42 Va. Cir. 205 (Rockingham County, 1997) (McGrath, J.); Messerley v. Avante Group,
Inc., 42 Va. Cir. 26 (Rockingham County, 1966) (McGrath, J.); Roadcap v. Beverley Enterprises, Inc.
(Rockingham County, 1996) (Hupp, J.); Benedict v. Community Hosp. of [*360] Roanoke Valley, 10 Va.
Cir. 430 (City of Roanoke, 1988) (Coulter, J.); Johnson v. Roanoke Memorial Hosp., 9 Va. Cir. 196 (City of
Roanoke, 1987) (Coulter, J.); and Atkinson v. Thomas, 9 Va. Cir. 21 (City of Virginia Beach, 1986) (Russo,
J.).
The Defendant cites to a number of circuit court opinions which have held that incident reports such as the
one involved here are covered by the quality assurance deliberative privilege set forth in § 8.01-581.17. See,
e.g., Jones v. Rezba (City of Winchester, 1997) (Wetsel, J.); Stevens v. Lemmie, 40 Va. Cir. 499 (City of
Petersburg, 1996) (Lemons, J.); Adams v. Patterson (City of Winchester, 1994) (Wetsel, J.); Mangano v.
Kavanaugh, 30 Va. Cir. 66 (Loudoun County, 1993) (Home, J.); Houchens v. University of Va., 23 Va. Cir.
202 (City of Charlottesville, 1991) (Swett, J.); Hedgepeth v. [**10] Jesudian, 15 Va. Cir. 352 (City of
Richmond, 1989) (Markow, J.); Riordan v. Fairfax Hosp. System, Inc., 28 Va. Cir. 560 (Fairfax County, 1988)
(McWeeny, J.); Francis v. McEntee, 10 Va. Cir. i26 (Henrico County, 1987) (Kulp, J.); Peck v. Chippenham
Hosp., Inc. (Medical Malpractice Review Panel, City of Richmond, 1986) (Nance, J.).
After reviewing all of these decisions and the evidentiary record established in the hearing on the instant
motion, this Court continues to believe that the position as set forth in Huffman v. Beverly Calif, Corp., 42 Va.
Cir. 205 (1997), and Messerley v. Avante Group, 42 Va. Cir. 26 (1996), is an accurate statement and
interpretation of the applicable law. In the Huffman and Messerly opinions, this Court indicated that records
such as these, which are standard incident reports that are filed for any accident occurring at a medical
facility, are not shielded from discovery by the provisions of § 8.01-581.17 because they do not rise to the
level as contemplated by the statute of being quality assurance deliberative documents. They are simply
recitations of the accident that occurred, the witnesses who were present, and other objective facts that can
be ascertained [**11] from the eyewitnesses to the incident. As such, they are much more akin to the
ordinary hospital records, which are exempted from the reach of this privilege pursuant to the last sentence
of §8.01-581.17.
It is certainly clear that the legislature has determined as a matter of public policy in Virginia that many of
the documents utilized in, by, and with quality assurance organizations within medical facilities are to be
exempt from discovery (absent a showing of special need) in order to facilitate the free flow of information
between staff personnel and quality assurance committees. Although that is a commendable objective and
needs to be adhered to whenever the deliberative process is involved, it appears to be an [*361J
impermissible reading of the statute to extend this privilege to cover all factual reports or incident reports of
accidents that happen at a hospital simply because they are sent to a quality assurance committee.
The basis of this Court's decision was set forth very well by Judge Coulter in his decision in Benedict v.
Community Hosp., 10 Va. Cir. 430 (1988), when he stated:
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The argument that all field work, the incident reports, the questions concerning [**12] falls that might
proceed a peer review meeting should be free from discovery... must yield to the more compelling mandate
of the statute's last sentence. Otherwise, all documents could become privileged simply by the committee
requiring their production or attaching them to the minutes. As stated in Johnson: "almost anything could
come within such broad and limitless sweep." Id. at page 436.
Therefore, the Defendant, Rockingham Memorial Hospital, will be ordered to produce within ten days of
this Order copies of all incident reports that have been requested by the Plaintiff.
I I . Discoverability of the Defendant's Policies, Procedures, and Protocols
The Plaintiffs position at this the discovery stage of the litigation is that he is entitled to obtain the policies,
procedures, and protocols of Rockingham Memorial Hospital relating to fall prevention, vest restraints,
nursing rounds, and post-incident care of patients involved in such incidents because (1) these policies,
procedures, and protocols are not "the proceedings, minutes, records, and reports of a medical staff
committee or utilization review committee or other committee specified in § 8.01-581.16" nor are they
communications [**13] originating in or provided to such committees; and (2) the fact that such policies,
procedures, and protocols may not be introduced into evidence under the Supreme Court's holding in Pullen
& McCoy v. Nickens, 226 Va. 342, 310 S.E.2d 452 (1993), does not mean that such documents cannot be
obtained in discovery pursuant to Rule 4:1(b)(1). The Plaintiff contends that such information may be
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." In short, the Plaintiff takes the
position that it is premature at this point to determine the admissibility into evidence of these documents and
that discovery should be permitted.
The Defendant Hospital, on the other hand, argues vigorously that the policies, procedures, and protocols
established by the hospital are the result of [*362] the peer review process and thus are privileged as a
written communication originating from such a. committee under the provisions of § 8.01-581.17 of the Code
of Virginia, and, in addition, are exempt from discovery because they are not likely to result in the discovery
of admissible evidence because pursuant to § 8.01-581.20 of the Code of Virginia, the standard of care is
established by statute, and [**14] under the holding.ofthe Supreme Court in Pullen v. Nickens, supra, the
private rules, regulations:, and procedures established by a party are not admissible in determining whether
or not che party has met the applicable standard of care.
As In the case of the decisional authority relating to incident reports, the circuit courts are fairly evenly split
on the issue of whether policies, procedures, and protocols of medical care providers can be obtained in
discovery. A number of courts have held that the privilege set forth in § 8.01-581.17 only applies to the
deliberative processes by which peer review groups establish procedures and protocols and does not extend
to the final product thereof and that the scope of discovery set forth in Rule 4:1(b)(1) is broad enough to
permit Plaintiffs to obtain this material in discovery before reaching the issue of whether such materials may
be introduced at trial. See, e.g., Houchens v. University of Va., 23 Va. Cir. 202 (City of Charlottesville, 1991)
(Swett, J.); Curtis v. Fairfax Hosp. Systems, Inc., 21 Va. Cir. 275 (Fairfax County, 1990) (Annunziata, J.);
Hedgepeth v. Jesudian, 12 Va. Cir. 221 (City of Richmond, 1988) (Markow, J.); Johnson v. Roanoke [**15]
Memorial Hosp., 9 Va. Cir. 196 (City of Roanoke, 1987) (Coulter, J.).
The courts which have denied discovery of policy, procedures, and protocol manuals of medical care providers
have done so on the grounds that either: (1) they are privileged written communications originating from a
peer review group covered by the provisions of § 8.01-581.17 of the Code of Virginia and/or (2) that the
internal policies, procedures, and protocols established by a medicai care provider are irrelevant to
determining whether or not the defendant has violated the statutory mandated standard of care for medical
care providers. See, e.g., Adams v. Patterson (City of Winchester, 1994) (Wetsel, J.); Mangano v.
Kavanaugh, 30 Va. Cir. 66 (Loudoun County, 1993) (Home, J.); Riordan v. Fairfax Hosp. Systems, Inc., 28
Va. Cir. 560 (Fairfax County, 1988) (McWeeny, J.); Leslie v. Alexander, 14 Va. Cir. 127 (City of Alexandria,
1988) (Swersky, J.); Francis v. McEntee, 10 Va. Cir. 126 (Henrico County, 1987) (Kulp, J.); and Peck v.
Chippenham Hosp., Inc. (Medical Malpractice Review Panel, City of Richmond, 1986) (Nance, J.).
On the issue of whether the policies, procedures, and protocol manuals of a medical care [**16] provider are
privileged under § 8.01-581.17 of the Code of [*363] Virginia, this Court believes that the rationale set
forth by Judge Annunziata in Curtis v. Fairfax Hosp. Systems, Inc., 21 Va. Cir. 275 (1990), and Judge Coulter
in Johnson v. Roanoke Memorial Hosp., 9 Va. Cir. 196 (1987), is the better reasoned analysis of the decided
cases. Clearly, the internal dialogue and the give and take ofthe peer review process, which lead up to and
are an integral part of developing the policies, procedures, and protocols of medical care providers are
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exempted from discovery in the absence of good cause shown. However, the actual product that is generated
thereby, which are generally policy and procedure manuals that are intended to be followed by all of the
hospital staff and attending physicians are not part of the deliberative process but are the final result thereof
and do not share in the privilege conferred by the statute. Therefore, it is this Court's holding that the
privilege granted by § 8.01-581.17 does not protect from discovery the final result of the peer review
activity, that is the policies, procedures, and practices manuals that are ultimately promulgated by the
health [**17] care providers and which are used to govern the operations of the hospital.
However, given the clearly-delineated statutory standard of care that is set forth in § 8.01-581.20 of the
Code of Virginia and the still viable holding of the Supreme Court in Pullen v. Nickens, supra, it is extremely
doubtful that there is any way in which the internal policies, procedures, and protocols of medical care
providers could be admitted into evidence in this case. To permit such documents into evidence would clearly
destroy any incentive of medical care providers to adopt internal operating procedures which adopted
anything but the bare minimum standard. This is exactly the type of chilling effect that the holding in Pullen
v. Nickens, supra, was meant to prevent. However, at the discovery stage of the litigation, it cannot be said
with a certainty that these materials will not lead to the discovery of admissible evidence within the purview
of Rule 4:1(b)(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court.
Therefore, solely for the purposes of discovery, this Court holds that these materials are to be produced to
the Plaintiff pursuant to the various discovery requests that have been filed in this case. The [**18] Court
cautions that what is covered by this Opinion and Order are the final and operative policies, procedures, and
protocols relating to the subject matter at hand and that this ruling does not extend to any internal
documentation reflecting the deliberations of the committees or groups which led to the formulation of the
final policies and procedures that were in place at the time of the accident. Therefore, the Defendant will be
required to produce these materials to Plaintiff within ten days of this Order.
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c
Circuit Court of Virginia.
Evelyn G. BENEDICT, Claimant
v.
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF ROANOKE
VALLEY, Health Care Provider
Feb. 29, 1988.
OPINION
COULTER, J.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: THE ISSUE
AND THE BACKGROUND
*1 The discoverability of incident reports, by
whatever name called, or their functional
equivalents, is the issue of the moment in
these proceedings. Evelyn G. Benedict was a
patient in the Community Hospital of
Roanoke Valley from October to December,
1983, having undergone amputation of the left
leg below the knee. While recuperating she
claims that she sustained additional injuries
to the stump of her leg, apparently as a result
of three separate events: a blow to the stump
of her leg during physical therapy on
November 22, 1983; falling on her stump on
November 27, 1983, while trying to move
unattended from her chair to her walker; and
again striking her abbreviated leg on
December 4, 1983, when she was dropped by a
nursing assistant. The claimant seeks to hold
the hospital responsible for these acts or
omissions of alleged negligence, contending
that as a result her healing was delayed,
additional pain, suffering, and depression
experienced, and further medical expenses
incurred.
On June 7, 1984, Ms. Benedict's attorney
requested access to all medical records
relating to her hospitalization and treatment.
Fifteen months later on October 10, 1985,
formal notice of a malpractice claim was
given. The hospital thereupon on December 4,
1985, requested that the claim be referred to a
medical review panel. After some discovery
efforts, an informal hearing on the defendant's
Copr. ® 2004 West. No Claim
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objections to the claimant's Interrogatory No.
7 was held on August 25, 1986, at which time
the incident reports prepared by the hospital
were held to be discoverable. This decision
was in keeping with several similar rulings
that the court had recently made. No order
memorializing this decision, however, was
ever submitted.
Thereafter the defendant disclosed that
though an incident report, which it identified
as a Quality Care Control Report, and a
"writing" by Charlotte Oliver had been
prepared contemporaneously with the incident
or incidents, they were now missing and hence
could not be produced for discovery purposes.
Though counsel for the defendant did not
know that the documents were missing at the
time he urged their immunity from discovery,
and no one is suggesting otherwise, the
claimant raises the nasty specter that they
could have been conveniently misplaced by
hospital personnel after resistance to its
production had proved unavailing— a very
uncomfortable and unpleasant suspicion the
validity of which will probably never be
known. In any event, the defendant in its
amended answer to Interrogatory No. 7 and
subsequent memorandum has identified eight
documents which it concedes could possibly be
construed as responsive to the claimant's
interrogatory.
THE INTERROGATORY AND THE
AMENDED ANSWER
Interrogatory No. 7 read as follows:
(7) Was any Incident Report or similar
document prepared following any of the
injuries Mrs. Benedict received involving her
stump? If so, please describe it and advise
who has custody of it now.
The defendant's amended answer and
subsequent memorandum have disclosed:
*2 1. Risk Management Review Report
(prepared after claimant's attorney's request
to review the medical records on June 7,
1984).
2. Routine Questions on Claims Concerning
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Falls (prepared by Head Nurse Belinda
Williams after claimant's attorney's request
to review the medical records).
3. & 4. Statements of Sharon Saferight, R.N.
and J. Harper, R.N. (prepared following a
visit from a member of the claimant's family
to the hospital on February 1, 1984, seeking
information about the injuries).
5. Statement of Nurse Williams (prepared at
the request of the hospital's in-house attorney
on May 6, 1984).
6. Supplemental statement of Nurse Williams
(prepared at the request of the insurance
carrier for use by its attorney after the
claimant's attorney's request to review the
claimant's medical records).
7. Statement of Charlotte Oliver, Nursing
Assistant (prepared at the request of the
insurance carrier on October 18, 1985, after
the claimant had filed her formal notice of
her claim against the hospital).
8. Transcript of insurance carrier's interview
with Diane Osborne, Director of Physical
Therapy (transcribed on February 11,1986,
for the use of the attorney for the insurance
carrier.)

2

have heretofore been thoroughly
and
painstakingly considered by this court after
the submission of excellent briefs and
persuasive arguments involving extensive
research in two other recent cases: Malone,
Exec. v. Gill Memorial, City of Roanoke Circuit
Court Law Action 86-0307, and Johnson, Admx.
v. Roanoke Memorial Hospitals, Inc., City of
Roanoke Circuit Court Law Action 87-321.
In Malone, an operation on the plaintiff's
decedent, Stella Reamey, for cataracts and a
lens implant was begun but aborted because of
the patient's restlessness under anesthesia.
She was sent to the recovery unit and shortly
thereafter to her room. Early the next
morning Ms. Reamey could not be aroused and
became comatose. She died four months later,
having never regained consciousness. The
incident report, recorded statements taken by
the insurance adjuster, and various manuals
were held discoverable over vigorous
objections of the defendant. There was no
formal written opinion rendered in that case
but a lengthy oral ruling was delivered from
the bench, transcribed and made a part of the
record.

THE DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION
The defendant contends that none of these
eight documents should be discoverable on the
following grounds:
1. That these reports, statements or
transcripts are privileged within the scope of §
8.01-581.17 of the Code of Virginia of 1950, as
amended.
2. That these documents were prepared in
anticipation of litigation and hence are
entitled to the protection of Rule 4:l(bX3) of
the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
3. That these documents were also prepared
at the request and for the review of an
attorney and are accordingly likewise entitled
to the protection of the same Rule 4:l(bX3).

THE PRECEDENTS OF THIS COURT:
MALONE & JOHNSON
These points and arguments in their support
Copr. ® 2004 West. No Claim

*3 In Johnson the plaintiff's decedent died at
age 33 on his way home after being treated for
a sore throat and released from the emergency
room of the Roanoke Memorial Hospital.
There were no incident reports available, but
the plaintiff sought certain formal Job
Descriptions for Nurses Aides and Registered
Nurses and the Care Manual on Triage and
Nursing Assessment. The court held that
these documents were discoverable, again over
the strong arguments of the defendant that
they were privileged under the same statute
relied on in this case (§ 8.01-581.17). The 13page written opinion, in which ten decisions
from other jurisdictions upholding the
discovery of similar material were cited, noted
at the outset:
Because of the importance of the issue, the
tenacity of the defendant's resistance, public
policy concerns in genuine conflict, and the
apparent differing attitudes and rulings of
state trial judges, a review of this court's
analysis and prior conclusion is justified. The
matter thus will be considered afresh and
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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subjected to more reasoned review.
CONCERN FOR CONSISTENCY, THOUGH
A FACTOR, DOES NOT CREATE
DISABILITY FOR SELFCORRECTION.
Consistency from the bench is an essential
ingredient of justice; it is a necessary
component of a stable jurisprudence. Upon it
rests the doctrine of stare decisis. Precedent
would be meaningless without it. Continuity
of the law and respect for past decisions satisfy
the need for some certainty and understanding
of what the law is. Treating litigants equally
under similar factual situations is simply a
trademark of AngloAmerican law. And yet, as
Emerson has so poignantly put it:
Consistency [FN1] is the hobgoblin of little
minds, adored by petty statesmen,
philosophers and divines.
FN1. It is, of course, a foolish consistency that
Emerson condemns.

and
With consistency a great soul has simply
nothing to do. He may as well concern
himself with his shadow on the wall.
Concern for consistency, therefore, though a
significant factor, should never inhibit the
reexamination of complex issues; it should not
imprison reason nor create disability for selfcorrection. The problem, therefore, will again
be reviewed anew particularly since the
thrusts of this defendant's arguments are
somewhat different than those advanced in
Malone and Johnson.
THE DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS
ANALYZED OXYMORONIA IS NOT THE
KEY. WHAT IS THE
"ORDINARY COURSE OF PATIENT
TREATMENT" IS THE ULTIMATE
QUESTION.
In Malone and Johnson the documents sought
to be discovered, other than the incident
report, were for the most part materials
developed after the meetings of peer review
committees. In the case at bar it is suggested
that the reports at issue would have preceded
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such meetings. Hence the defendant places
great emphasis on the provision in § 8.01581.17 which grants privilege to "... all
communications, both oral and written,
originating in or provided to such committees."
Since such reports were, in fact, provided to a
committee or committees that come within the
protective umbrella of the statute, ergo by
inescapable logic they are privileged. And so it
would seem to be except for the last provision
of this statute which, as in Malone and Johnson,
must still be reckoned with.
*4 Nothing in this section shall be construed
as providing any privilege to hospital medical
records kept with respect to any patient in the
ordinary course of business of operating a hospital
nor to any facts or information contained in
such records nor shall this section preclude or
affect discovery of or production of evidence
relating to hospitalization or treatment of
any patient in the ordinary course of
hospitalization of such patients.
Unlike the arguments presented in Malone
and Johnson, the defendant at bar urges most
earnestly and vigorously that the records or
evidence sought were not kept in the ordinary
course of the business of operating a hospital
nor did they relate to the hospitalization or
treatment of a patient. The defendant argues,
in other words, that before the exclusion of the
last provision of the statute can apply the
records or evidence sought must have been
medical records kept in the ordinary course of
the business of operating a hospital, or they
must relate to the ordinary course of
hospitalization or treatment of the patient.
The defendant's argument continues that
incident or risk management review reports,
routine questions concerning falls, and
interviews with nurses who may know
something about a patient's fall are not
medical records and are not kept in the
ordinary course of the business of operating a
hospital nor do they include facts or evidence
relating to the hospitalization or treatment of
a patient in the ordinary course of the
hospitalization of a patient. Therefore, the
defendant contends, such records should not be
granted the immunity from privilege which
was intended by the last sentence of this
statute.

Copr. @ 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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This argument, however, begs the question.
What are, or should be, records kept in the
ordinary course of treating a patient or
operating a hospital with respect to patients,
that is the ultimate question. The ordinary
course of a hospital's function surely includes
the prevention of accidents or mishaps to those
who have been entrusted to its care. Charting
the ordinary course of a patient's treatment
would or should require description of events
out of the ordinary that relate to a patient's
health and well-being. As a health care
provider, protection from further illness or
injury is an inescapable component of treating
a patient.
To suggest that negligent acts or omissions
are not a part of a patient's usual treatment
and that, therefore, they should not be
considered as part and parcel of delivering
health care may be oxymoronic, as erudite
counsel suggests, but such characterization
does not thereby make the argument valid. It
is false reasoning as the following analysis
should demonstrate. The defendant advances
this proposition:
Premise: An accident is not part of a patient's
usual treatment.
Conclusion: Therefore any record concerning
an accident, it not being usual or in the
ordinary course of patient treatment, is
privileged.
*5 The premise may indeed be oxymoronic,
i.e. self-contradictory. Causing additional
injury by accident is certainly contradictory to
the notion of usual treatment. But the fallacy
in this argument exists in the definition of
terms; confusion is created in stating the
premise. It is not claimed, nor could it be
reasonably suggested, that causing an
accident is part of a patient's usual treatment;
the contention is that the prevention of
accident is, or should be, part of his usual
treatment.
Thus the smoke screen of oxymoronia
beclouds the issue. The only oxymoronic
element in this controversy is the statute itself
(oxymoronic meaning a self-contradictory
expression such as "cruel kindness"; but being
oxymoronic does not settle an argument:
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim
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What could be more within the ordinary
course of the treatment of a patient who has
lost her leg than careful supervision that she
not fall on her stump, that she not be left
negligently unattended, that she be helped
with due care when she shifts from chair to
bed or from bed to walker, that her physical
therapy be conducted with proper attention.
Because a hospital may not choose to call a
document a "medical record" or may contend
that various reports are not maintained in the
ordinary course of a hospital's business or a
patient's treatment does not make it so. The
ordinary course of a hospital's business or a
patient's treatment is the welfare and safety
of its patients. And any document that relates
to that all-embracing concept comes, or should
come, within the meaning of the last sentence
of the statute in question, oxymoronic as it
makes the entire section, except, as this court
has indicated in its Johnson opinion, the
precise proceedings and minutes of the true
peer review committees where the free
exchange of criticisms should not be hindered.
The argument that all the field work, the
incident reports, the questions concerning falls
that might precede a peer review meeting,
should be free from discovery (which
admittedly is granted by the statutory
language that "all communications
provided to such committees" are privileged)
must yield to the more compelling mandate of
the statute's last sentence. Otherwise, all
documents could become privileged simply by
the committee requiring their production, or
attaching* them to the minutes. As stated in
Johnson: "Almost anything could come within
such broad and limitless sweep."
"ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION" MUST
BE THE PREDOMINANT REASON OF
CREATING A
DOCUMENT; "NEED" FOR DISCOVERY IS
A RELATIVE CONCEPT.
If not privileged, then, within the meaning of
the contradictory provisions of the statute in
question, the defendant urges that nonetheless
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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they should not be discoverable since they
were prepared in anticipation of litigation and
are protected by the provisions of Rule
4:l(bX3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court.
Here, again, a litigant can always claim that
documents sought were made in "anticipation
of litigation." In reality, when an untoward
event has occurred to a patient in a hospital
causing injury, hospital officials, keenly
conscious of the litigious nature of the
American character, will undertake an
investigation to accumulate facts so as to be
fully informed if claim is ultimately made.
But such information is also sought in pursuit
of the hospital's noble objectives of remedying
procedures or policies that bring about
accidents. The investigation is part of the
hospital's program of quality control.
*6 The injured patient, on the other hand, is
at such an unfair advantage: one single
individual, sick and weakly, pitted against a
colossal corporate giant with staff and
resources unlimited and personnel schooled in
the techniques of avoiding or minimizing
losses for claimed negligence. Already
incapacitated and perhaps further damaged by
the incident and at the complete mercy of the
personnel from whom she seeks recovery and
relief, she is hardly in position to undertake
critical investigation of what happened. It is,
after all, the search for truth that is the
engagement at hand and if, as defendant's
counsel volunteers, "The hospital's position is
not motivated by a desire to hide the
substantive contents of the reports, ..." then,
especially since the incident reports are no
longer available, their functional equivalents
should be produced. It is, of course, the factual
presentation of what happened that is
discoverable; mental impressions, conclusions
or opinions are not included. All factual
statements and reports, therefore, that were
obtained prior to the claimant's attorney's
entrance on the scene (June 7, 1984), which
include Documents No. 3, 4, and 5, should be
discoverable, as the defendant has not
sustained its burden of showing that they were
predominantly made in anticipation of
litigation.
As to Document No. 1 (the Risk Management
Copr. ® 2004 West. No Claim
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Review Report) and Document No. 2 (Routine
Questions of Claims Concerning Falls)
prepared apparently after June 7, 1984, when
the claimant's attorney made his first request
(although the claimant's attorney in her brief
at p. 8 represents that Document No. 2 was
prepared on or about February 1, 1984) the
court is satisfied that enough substantial need
has been shown to require the production of
these documents and that obtaining their
substantial equivalent could not only not be
obtained "without undue hardship" but could
probably not be obtained at all.
Document No. 6, the supplemental statement
of Head Nurse Williams, even though
prepared after the appearance of the
claimant's attorney, should be considered and
treated as an addendum to her original
statement
and
therefore
should
be
discoverable.
As to Documents Nos. 7 and 8, statements of
employees of the defendant that were obtained
after the claimant's formal notice of an official
claim on October 18, 1985, neither sufficient
need nor hardship has been demonstrated to
justify their disclosure. They were prepared,
one nearly two years and the other more than
two years after the events, and subsequent to
the
equivalent
of
instituting
suit.
Furthermore, they were obviously obtained at
the behest of trial counsel and hence are more
clearly a part of the attorney's work product.
The claimant's need to disclose them is far
less substantial; and her ability to obtain the
recollection and statements of these witnesses
are otherwise available without invasion of
trial counsel's files.
CONCLUSION: THE COURT'S FUNCTION
IS TO BALANCE CONFLICTING
INTERESTS AS FAIRLY
AND JUSTLY AS SOCIETY'S CONSCIENCE
MIGHT REQUIRE.
*7 In the final analysis the critical test in
resolving the dispute at issue is the fair and
just balancing of conflicting interests. What
are the benefits to be achieved in refusing
disclosure against the harm to the claimant
that might thereby result. The records sought
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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are not the pure peer review proceedings that
public policy might justify in keeping secret.
They are not the minutes of meetings during
which self-criticism and fault-finding within
the organization are encouraged. At issue
basically are factual reports of several
incidents that occurred while a patient of a
hospital was undergoing treatment. Disclosing
the contents of these reports for discovery
purposes- since the hospital has nothing to
hide-should not cause undue harm to the
hospital. It should not-and will notdiscourage nor frustrate their continuing and
self-serving efforts to improve the delivery of
health care. On the other hand, a woman
whose leg had been amputated has allegedly
sustained additional injury to the stump of her
severed limb while at the mercy of and under
the control of the defendant hospital and its
personnel.
The issue of the moment is not was the
hospital negligent; that is reserved for a later
day. The present question involves the search
for the truth, for the factual, objective
development of what took place. And the
ultimate presentation of the evidence that
these reports might provoke, it must be noted,
is not to be submitted before a lay jury— at
least not at this time. No lawsuit has yet been
started. We are before a medical review panel,
at the request of the defendant, composed of
doctors and lawyers who unlike the usual trier
of facts are commissioned to seek out those
facts. One would assume that the panel would
want access to all records and documents
available. Certainly, the climate before a
medical review panel is considerably different
than the litigation pit of a trial.

6

facts that are solely within his knowledge.
When the input by one party to an issue in
dispute has been so handicapped at the outset
because of the conditions of health and the
location and environment in which the
incidents occurred and when measured against
the relative investigative strengths of the
parties, natural notions of fair play lean
heavily toward opening rather than closing
doors that might balance the contest. The
potential harm to the claimant in refusing the
discovery sought far outweighs the benefit to
the defendant in maintaining their secrecy.
*8 Considering all the factors herein
discussed, therefore, it is the judgment of this
court, serving as chairman of this panel, that
the claimant's request as to the production of
Document Nos. 1-6 should be granted, but
denied as to Document Nos. 7 and 8. To such
extent the defendant's objections
are
overruled.
10 Va. Cir. 430, 1988 WL 626030 (Va. Cir.
Ct.)
END OF DOCUMENT

As observed by the author of the annotation
in 15 A.L.R.3d 1446 "Scope of Defendant's
Duty of Pretrial Discovery in Medical
Malpractice Action":
A majority of courts that have spoken on the
question have allowed the plaintiff in a
medical malpractice action quite liberal
discovery, many specifically stating that the
difficulty in discovering evidence in a
malpractice action makes it all the more
important that the plaintiff be allowed to
examine the defendant, especially as to those
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim
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c
Circuit Court of Virginia, Loudoun County.
Betty Mangano
v.
Michael A. Kavanaugh, M.D. and Loudoun
Hospital Center
LAW # 13357.
January 21, 1993.
*1 On , this Court heard counsels' arguments
on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery. At
that time, the Court ruled on all of plaintiffs
discovery requests with the exception of those
relating to the production of information to
which a privilege is asserted pursuant to '
8.01-581.17, Code of Virginia. Because of the
differing rulings among the circuit courts in
Virginia regarding the scope of the privilege
encompassed by ' 8.01-581.17, the Court took
these discovery requests under advisement.
Thomas D. Home, Judge.
On January 13, 1993, counsel informed the
Court that the parties had settled all claims
and that the matter would not be going to
trial. Although this settlement makes
plaintiffs discovery requests moot, the Court,
having taken the matter under advisement,
believes it would be appropriate and beneficial
to advise counsel how it would have ruled on
the protection to be granted under ' 8.01581.17 in medical malpractice cases.
Section 8.01-581.17 of the Virginia Code
protects from the discovery process:
"The proceedings, minutes, records, and
reports of any medical staff committee,
utilization review committee, or other
committee as specified in ' 8.01-581.16 ,
together with all communications, both oral
and written, originating in or provided to such
committees...."
The committees specified by ' 8.01-581.16
include:

"... such committee, board, group, commission
or other entity which functions primarily to
review, evaluate, or make recommendations
on (i) the duration of patient stays in health
care facilities, (ii) the professional services
furnished with respect to the medical or dental
necessity for such services, (iii) the purpose of
promoting the most efficient use of available
health care facilities and services, (iv) the
adequacy or quality of professional services,
(v) the competency and qualifications for
professional staff privileges, or (vi) the
reasonableness or appropriateness of charges
made by or on behalf of health care facilities;
provided that such entity has been established
pursuant to federal or state law or regulation,
or pursuant to Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals requirements, or
established and duly constituted by one or
more public or licensed private hospitals...."
The differing opinions from the circuit courts
regarding ' 8.01-581.17 have come in the
interpretation
of
what
constitutes
"proceedings, minutes, records, and reports" of
the covered committees as well as the intent of
the legislature is limiting discovery of "all
communications, both oral and written,
originating in or provided to such
committees". Some courts have taken a broad
approach to the privilege granted by ' 8.01581.17 and have held that communications
such as a hospital's policy and procedure
manual are privileged from disclosure, as well
as hospital "Incident Reports" regarding a
particular patient's claim of injury resulting
from medical treatment. See e.g., Hedgepeth
v. Jesudian, 15 Va.Cir. 352 (1989) (discovery
permitted as to guidelines but not as to
reports); Leslie v. Alexander, 14 Va.Cir. 127
(1988); Francis v. McEntee, 10 Va.Cir. 126
(1987). On the other hand, some courts have
taken a more narrow approach and have held
that such communications are not privileged
from the discovery process. See e.g.,
Hedgepeth v. Jesudian, 12 Va.Cir. 221 (1988)
(see above); Sawyer v. Childress, 12 Va.Cir.
184 (1988); Benedict v. Community Hospital,
10 Va.Cir. 430 (1988) (medical malpractice
review panel); Johnson v. Roanoke Memorial

Copr. ® 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Hospitals, 9 Va.Cir. 196 (1987); Atkinson v.
Thomas, 9 Va.Cir. 21 (1986).
*2 This Court is of the opinion that ' 8.01581.17 should be read broadly and that
protection
should
be
accorded
all
communications originating from or provided
to such medical committees. The Court
believes this broad approach is consistent with
the objective of the statute which is to
encourage health care providers "to adopt
policies and procedures which will provide the
public with the highest degree of care
recognized by the medical and scientific
communities at any given time." Francis v.
McEntee, 10 Va.Cir. 126, 128 (1987). In
enacting ' 8.01-581.17, the Virginia General
Assembly recognized that in order to achieve
this goal there must be open and frank
discussions "where criticisms are actually
encouraged and mistakes or deficiencies
aggressively exposed...." Johnson v. Roanoke
Memorial Hospitals, Inc., 9 Va.Cir. 196, 198
(1987). In addition, the legislature recognized
the need for privacy in order to promote the
type of vigorous debate where such open
exchanges could be made without fear of
public disclosure. Indeed, without protection
from disclosure such discussions would
probably be meaningless and without
substance. Thus, it is the Court's opinion that
the intent of the legislator's in enacting ' 8.01581.17 was to afford the utmost protection to
such communications and thus make them
privileged from the discovery process.
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denied discovery as to such privileged matters.
The Court's comments on each request is as
follows:
"Interrogatory 9. State completely and in
detail
your
procedure
for
inquiry,
investigation or review of complaints or
reports of potential or actual malpractice by
either staff physicians or physicians granted
privileges in the hospital; and if such
procedure has been modified or amended since
August, 1986, state precisely the former
procedure and the modified or amended
procedure, giving the effective date of
modification or amendment."
This request essentially calls for the
production of the hospital's policy and
procedure manual detailing how medical
malpractice claims are investigated and
handled by the hospital. As noted above, the
circuit courts are split on the particular issue
of the discovery of such internal manuals.
Those courts holding that such manuals are
discoverable rationalize that they are merely
the end result of confidential committee
proceedings and, as such, do not merit the
same concern for protection from public
scrutiny. See e.g., Johnson v. Roanoke
Memorial Hospitals, supra at 199 (the
"depersonalized manuals of procedure which
have been shorn of individualized criticisms"
are not protected from discovery).

The Plaintiff has not at this stage of the
proceedings demonstrated "good cause arising
from extraordinary circumstances" which
would justify a disclosure of those matters to
which the privilege is asserted. Similarly, the
Court need not at this time address the issue
of relevancy of specific discovery requests.
Pullen & McCoy v. Nickens, 226 Va. 342
(1983).

*3 This Court believes, however, that such
policy manuals are encompassed by the
privilege under ' 8.01-581.17. Such manuals,
while they may be the end-product of
confidential
proceedings,
are
still
communications originating from a committee
whose function it is to review, evaluate, or
make recommendations on health care
facilities and services. As such, they should be
given
the
protection
accorded
other
confidential communications.

Addressing each of plaintiffs discovery
requests to which defendants claimed a
privilege under ' 8.01-518.17, the Court would
have ruled that as to certain matters
requested the privilege has been properly
asserted ' 8.01-581.17 and thus would have

"Interrogatory 10. Identify separately ... all
communication, written and oral, from you to
either Michael A. Kavanagh, M.D. or Paul L.
Weiner, M.D. or to you from either of them
relating to or in any way connected with the
possibility of a claim or the actual claim by
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Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

^*~

Wesfl&w

Not Reported in S.E.2d
(Cite as: 1993 WL 945920, *3 (Va. Cir. Ct.))
Plaintiff that is the subject of this litigation;
and identify fully all persons who were
present when each such communication was
made."
The Court believes this request clearly falls
within the scope of the privilege encompassed
by
'
8.01-581.17
as
communications
originating from or provided to a committee
(formed under ' 8.01-581.16) whose function it
is to review "the adequacy or quality of
professional services." As such, these
communications are protected from discovery.
This request may also be seeking the
production of the hospital's "Incident Report"
(or its functional equivalent) as it relates to
Plaintiffs claim against defendants. The
courts which have held that these reports are
discoverable have rationalized that they fall
within the exception of' 8.01- 581.17 - that is,
they are "... records kept with respect to any
patient in the ordinary course of business of
operating a hospital...." See e.g., Benedict v.
Community Hospital, supra. However, this
Court believes that such communications are
clearly part of the confidential process
envisioned by ' 8.01-581.17 and must be
protected from disclosure. Indeed, a hospital's
review and evaluation of a malpractice claim
is exactly the type of communication most
deserving of frank and open discussion
without fear of public disclosure. To the extent
that
plaintiffs
request
sought
such
communications, it would have been denied.
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professional staff privileges." As such, these
communications are protected from discovery.
*4 "Interrogatory 19. Identify each and every
person by name, employer, profession, address
and telephone number that was involved in
any way with the actual claim or possible
claim by Plaintiff ... or any inquiry,
investigation or review referred to in
Interrogatory 18 above; and for each person,
state their role and the relevant events with
which they were connected."
"Interrogatory 20. Identify separately ... each
and every document produced or generated in
connection with any of the events or persons
referred to in Interrogatories 17, 18 and 19
above; and for each such document, identify
fully the person who has possession, custody or
control thereof."
To the extent that these requests seek
underlying documentation to interrogatories
previously ruled privileged, the Court would
rule that these requests would also be denied.
30 Va. Cir. 66,1993 WL 945920 (Va. Cir. Ct.)
END OF DOCUMENT

"Interrogatory 18. State fully and in detail
each and every inquiry, investigation and/or
review of either Michael A. Kavanagh, M.D.
or Paul L. Weiner, M.D., including without
limitation all relevant dates, circumstances,
findings, recommendations, reprimands or
other actions."
The Court believes that this request also
clearly falls within the scope of the privilege
encompassed
by
'
8.01-581.17
as
communications originating from or provided
to a committee (formed under ' 8.01-581.16)
whose function it is to review "the adequacy or
quality of professional services," as well as
"the competency and qualifications for
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim

Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

^ -

Exhibit M

Formatting page(s). Please wait-

Page 1 of 2

S B . I5»
UEALTH CARE REFORM II
Senat»F
Plow Amendment

Au/ I L'tt*ri*s^

FEBRUARY 3 1994 OS

pnoposes ihe following amendment*;

26-25-3. Information considered privileged cormmankatiora*
All information, including information requiredforthe medicai md health section of birth
certificates m determined by the state registrar of vital records appointed under Chapter % io
interviews! reports, statements, memoranda, or other date famished by reason of this chapter,
and any findings or conclusions resulting from those studies are privileged communications and
(may ant be ttscil or ireeived] ARE NOT SUBJECT Tt> wscovTay, tiSE, OR RBCEirr IN
evidence in any legal proceeding of any kind or character.
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ILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 2 8 2003
By.

SALT LAKE QWHTY^
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IONA ADAM, et al.

MINUTE ENTRY DECISION AND
ORDER

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 020910871
vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, et al.
Defendant.

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel,
pursuant to Rule 4-501.

Having considered the Motion and the

Memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court enters the following
decision:
The present Motion seeks to compel Defendants' production of
incident reports requested from the Plaintiffs.

In denying the

request, the Defendant asserted that "if such documents exist, they
are not discoverable and are privileged pursuant to § 26-25-3, Utah
Code Ann. (1996)."

This statutory provision, otherwise known as

the care review privilege, "privileges only documents prepared
specifically to be submitted for review purposes" and cannot be
read so broadly as extending to all "documents that might or could
be used in the review process."

Benson ex rel. Benson v. IHC
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Hospitals, 866 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah 1993).

Utah law is clear that

the party invoking the privilege must produce evidence establishing
its applicability to the documents in question. See id., at 538.
Accordingly, Plaintifffs Motion to Compel is hereby GRANTED.
Defendant is hereby ordered to produce either the incident reports
as requested, or evidence that the incident reports were created
"specifically

to

be

submitted

for

review

purposes."

This

constitutes the final order of the Court on the matters referenced
herein.

No further order is required.

DATED this

day of October, 2003.

Judge WILLIAM B. ;£OHL.
District Court Judge
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
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